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In 1917, Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the well-known dictum that
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . ."I To many
persons this statement has constituted an article of faith. In 1956, Pro-
fessor Albert Ehrenzweig challenged the basis of this faith in a provoc-
ative article.2 Briefly stated, Ehrenzweig's thesis is that the true basis
of jurisdiction at common law was a principle he calls "forum con-
veniens," based on "contact" of the forum with either the case (e.g.,
accrual there) or with one of the parties (e.g., domicile of the defendant,
or domicile of the plaintiff if the defendant be an alien).8 Under the
modem doctrine of forum non conveniens, jurisdiction is technically
present but is declined because of the inconvenience of the venue.
Under Ehrenzweig's doctrine of forum conveniens, jurisdiction is tech-
nically lacking, not merely declined, when the requisite contacts are
absent.
Professor Ehrenzweig's interest in the foundation of jurisdiction
seems to stem from his desire to effect reforms in the field of conflicts,
particularly in the areas of choice of forum and choice of law. My
own concern with the same matter lies in the belief that a knowledge
of the history of personal jurisdiction greatly facilitates an understand-
ing of contemporary problems of mesne process 4 and provisional secu-
rity.
Ehrenzweig blames Pennoyer v. Neff5 for the spread of the "myth"
t Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.S. 1943, MississippiState College; LL.B. 1949, University of Mississippi; J.S.D. 1967, Yale University. This
article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation.
1. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). The complete quotation reads: "The
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it is not necessary
to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun, and although submission
to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of service upon the person." Id.
2. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth andForum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) [hereinafter cited asEhrenzweig]. Ehrenzwelg
reiterates these views in his textbook. I A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLiCr oF LAws 78-79 (1959).
3. Ehrenzweig 289.
4. "Mesne process" now refers to all process before the "final" process of execution
upon judgment. See note 21 infra.
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In this landmark decision, the Court held that a judgment against
a nonresident defendant (a natural person in the particular case) had been rendered
without due process of law and did not bind either the defendant personally or his prop.
erty within the state of rendition of the judgment because there had been neither personal
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that the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.0 He then iden-
tifies two results of this "power myth": (1) Personal process erroneously
became required for personal jurisdiction;7 and (2) "When the law thus
came to compel the plaintiff to 'catch' his defendant, it quite consis-
tently began to hold this feat sufficient for the establishment of juris-
diction." s The first of these results is called the "power doctrine"; the
second is Ehrenzweig's "transient rule." They must not be confused,
for they suggest basically different inquiries: (1) Was physical power
over the defendant necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction in common
law personal actions (the "power doctrine")? (2) Is such power by itself
a sufficient basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction (the "transient
rule")?
Ehrenzweig is more concerned with the transient rule than with the
power doctrine, since the transient rule would permit the unbridled
exercise of jurisdiction based solely on service of process upon the de-
fendant within the sovereign's territory. He believes that the doctrine
of forum non conveniens was created as a necessary restraint upon
such jurisdiction.9 Furthermore, he says that the elimination of the
transient rule "may help to minimize the problem [of choice of law]
by limiting the choice of forum on rational grounds to one having such
contacts with the case as will justify the application of the chosen
forum's own law."'" This article is primarily concerned with the power
doctrine, for it is this doctrine which lies at the bottom of the structure
of mesne process which will be studied herein. A few further comments
on the transient rule seem, nevertheless, to be in order at this point."1
Much of Ehrenzweig's attack upon the historical accuracy of the
transient rule rests upon an analysis of cases cited by Beale, Goodrich,
and Stumberge2 as support for their adherence to the rule. Ehrenzweig
service upon the defendant within the forum state nor any attachment of the property
prior to rendition of the judgment





11. It is worth noting, in connection with Ehrenzveig's claim that the transient rule
is an historical myth, that the House of Lords in 1867 prohibited its use in the Mayor's
Court of London with regard to service on garnishees. The decision, however, was based
upon the jurisdictional limitations inherent in the Mayor's Court as an inferior court
and in no way implies that a transient rule was not being or could not be applied in
the superior courts with which we will be concerned here. Sec Mayor and Aldermen v.
Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 239 (1867).
12. 1 J. BEA.E, CONFLiar OF LAws 339 n.6, 340 nn.1 & 2 (1935); Beale. The Jurisdiction
of Courts over Foreigners, 26 HA~v. L. Rav. 193, 282 (1912); H. GOODRICH, HAD1OO- OF
Ta CoruricT or LAws 189 (3d ed. 1949); G. Sru-mmo, PIUNcntLEs OF CoxFLcr OF LAWS
72 n.21 (2d ed. 1951).
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attempts to demonstrate that only two of those cases, neither of which
was decided prior to 1870, hold squarely to the transient rule. Even
assuming arguendo the validity of his premise that there is little case
law directly applying the transient rule during the common law period,
however, his conclusion that the transient rule is historically incorrect
is debatable. Although the supporters of the transient rule have cited
little common law judicial authority in support of their position,
Ehrenzweig has given none in support of his; that is, Ehrenzweig gives
us no case in which a court has denied the power to take jurisdiction
of a transient rule case. It can of course be argued that the scarcity of
cases supporting the transient rule must be taken to mean that the rule
probably did not exist. It can also be contended, however, that the
absence of cases opposing the rule must be taken to mean that the rule
did exist. While without more than these cases, either conclusion can
be argued for, the additional evidence I have found supports the second
of these conclusions. Before proceeding with an analysis of that evi-
dence it should be noted that there are better explanations for and
conclusions to be drawn from the paucity of common law cases on the
subject than those presented by Ehrenzweig, The basic question is
not whether the common law courts did entertain such suits, but
whether they believed they had the power to do so within their concept
of jurisdiction.
One may begin by asking whether the transient rule issue ever actu-
ally arose in the common law courts. In what situation was there any
real likelihood that, in the common law period, one alien would sue
another alien in an English court on a cause having no connection with
England other than the fact that the suit was brought in England? The
only one that suggests itself is the case of a foreign merchant who al-
legedly owed a mercantile obligation of some sort, and who either was
in England himself or who had tangible property situated in England
or debts owed him by a party present in England. In such circun-
stances, however, the suit would almost certainly have taken place, at
least until the seventeenth century, not in the common law courts but
in the admiralty and local courts where Law Merchant was adminis-
tered.13 In at least one important court applying the Law Merchant,
the transient rule actually was utilized for many centuries.14 There is
the further problem that in the absence of any notion of quasi in rem
13. See R. STEFEN, CAsES ON COMMERCIAL INVESTMIENT 4 (2d ed. 1954); 1 W. HoLDs-
WORTH, A HistORY OF ENGLISa LAW 530-32, 543 (4th ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited its HoLws.
WORTH]; 8 HOLDSWORTH 130, 146, 152.
14. The Mayor's Court of London. See notes 11 & 13 supra.
Vol. 78: 52, 1968
Mesne Process in Personal Actions
jurisdiction, the very fact of the defendant's transience tended to defeat
jurisdiction, since the slowness of service by the sheriff almost certainly
would permit the defendant to leave the jurisdiction before he could
be "caught." Is it surprising, then, that there are so few common law
cases on the subject? The availability of this alternative explanation for
the absence of case law on the Voint weakens Ehrenzweig's argument
that failure of the common law courts to assert the power establishes
the absence of the power.
But let us assume for the moment that Ehrenzweig is right in his
conclusion that the transient rule is historically incorrect. We still must
exercise caution as to what conclusion should be drawn from his posi-
tion that this rule "consistently" grew out of the power doctrine.1 5 The
danger lies in the possibility of confusing "consistent" with "necessary."
One then could reason quite logically that the historical incorrectness
of the transient rule proves the historical incorrectness of the power
doctrine, since it would seem impossible for the necessary result of an
historically correct doctrine to be historically incorrect. It would be
perfectly consistent, however, for a court to require power for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, yet to deny the presence of jurisdiction when power
over the defendant is the only contact the court has with the case. It
thus appears that the transient rule could be mythical at the same time
that the power doctrine is historically real.
Is the transient rule historically real? My own opinion accords with
that of Dean Cowen and with the orthodox view that the rule, while
perhaps not a good one, nevertheless has historically been the rule in
England, and is the rule today.10 It must be emphasized, however, that
the historical authenticity of the transient rule is by no means the same
matter as the authenticity of the power doctrine; and only the latter is
the concern of the remainder of this paper.
As to the question of the existence of the power doctrine, Professor
Ehrenzweig says:
English legal history furnishes little support for the power
doctrine. Even when the King's Bench, in competition with the
Common Pleas, began to base its personal jurisdiction upon the
physical arrest of the defendant, actual physical power over the
defendant was not invariably required.17
15. Ehrenzweig 508.
16. Cowan, A British View, in Transient Jurisdiction-Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff
-A Round Table, 9 J. PUB. 1 281, 503 (1960).
17. Ehrenzweig 297.
The Yale Law Journal
His support for the foregoing statement consists of the following
footnote:
Constructive custody of a defendant could be acquired by the
King's Bench by a mere record of the defendant's bail on the rolls,
3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287, and this in turn was obtain-
able without the cooperation of the defendant by the use of an
elaborate fiction. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
219-220 (1922).18
As will be shown later,'9 Ehrenzweig has probably misunderstood
Holdsworth, and Blackstone offers him little support in this regard.
There is, moreover, substantial authority to the effect that physical
power was necessary for the initial obtaining of jurisdiction over de-
fendants who would not appear to personal actions at common law,
without which power no judgment could be rendered for the plaintiff
against the defendant.
The first section of this paper will examine the problems growing
out of the nonappearance of defendants who could be found within the
jurisdiction of the court. It begins by demonstrating that the common
law courts were in fact unwilling to take jurisdiction over a nonap-
pearing defendant. Later the conclusion will be drawn that Ehrenzweig
is wrong in his assertion that the power doctrine is a myth, that is, in
his contention that the courts could take jurisdiction over defendants
not within reach of personal process. The logic of reasoning from what
the courts did not do to what they could not do, while not beyond
attack, is justified in this instance. Although the common law courts
seldom if ever considered a pure transient rule situation, they were
continually faced with the practical difficulties and miscarriages of
justice which resulted from their refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the
absence of power over the defendant. Nevertheless they persisted in
such refusal until matters were changed by statute in 1725. The con-
clusion seems unavoidable that the courts did not take jurisdiction
because they believed they could not do so.
We shall consider what was done when such defendants refused to
appear voluntarily. Attachment and distringas-methods of inducing
defendants to appear by seizing certain of their chattels--will be rela-
tively briefly treated because of the much greater importance of arrest
of the defendant himself. Arrest not only made attachment and com-
18. Id. 297-98 n.60.
19. Pp. 77-78 infra.
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mon law distringas obsolete, it also stimulated the creation of bail pro-
cedures and the enactment of the Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725.^ It is
my contention that this statute created the power of the superior courts
to render default judgments against nonappearing defendants not
within their custody, but upon whom process had been served.
Two related themes run through our story. We have thus far been
discussing the first theme, the problem of obtaining jurisdiction which
will support a personal judgment against the defendant. The second
theme traces how mesne21 process developed from a mere tool for pro-
curing jurisdiction over defendants and became also an instrument
for collection by the plaintiff of his debt or damages.2 2 Three phases
of growth of mesne process in the superior courts can be discerned from
this study:
1. The flouting of royal authority by defendants who would
not appear resulted in forfeiture to the Crown of property seized
under mesne process; but the plaintiff was not benefited thereby.
2. Properties acquired by the Crown through mesne process
became available to plaintiffs de grata, and plaintiffs took assign-
ments of "bail below," but not as a matter of right.
3. Plaintiffs acquired the right to reach properties seized and
bail put in.
The second section of the article will take up the problem confront-
ing a plaintiff who could not find his defendant for personal service of
process within the jurisdiction. This will bring us into the area of
outlawry, a subject whose importance is not generally appreciated to-
day. We shall examine the rise and extension of the uses of outlawry,
the roundabout procedure by which courts and plaintiffs dealt with
recalcitrant defendants, and shall note the important role it played in
the collection by plaintiffs from their absconding debtors.2 This last
matter is particularly interesting since outlawry did not result in a
judgment for the plaintiff on his own cause of action, but constituted
20. 12 Geo. 1, c. 29.
21. The term "mesne," as used in the law of process, is a source of confusion to many
modem students because although the literal meaning of the term is "middle." today we
begin our law suits with mesne process. At common law, mesne process was any process
between the "original" process of summons under the original Chancery writ and te
"final" process of execution upon judgment. With the demise of the wt system, the
initial process then came out of the courts of law, but the name "mesne" continued to
be used for it.
22. The significance of this second theme may be misunderstood by the modem Ameri-
can legal mind, accustomed to quasi in rem jurisdiction (discussed at note 30 infra), for
our second theme is not the story of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The common law courts
never seem to have embraced such a form of jurisdiction and our second theme may in
part explain why.
23. Pp. 80-87 infra.
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the end of the plaintiff's suit and a change in the status of the defendant,
I shall also present a theory as to the contribution of outlawry to the
development of indebitatus assumpsit. Finally, just as arrest made
attachment largely obsolete, new statutory procedures ("statuable" dis.
tringas) and garnishment execution eventually did away with the ne-
cessity for outlawry, We shall examine its displacement by these modes
of procedure.
I. Mesne Process and the Defendant Within the Reach of Process
A. The Early Difficulties in Obtaining Jurisdiction; Summons, Attach-
ment and Distringas
The early common law personal actions rested on a rather primitive
jurisdictional basis. If the judgment sought was personal, the defendant
had to make a voluntary appearance in court. As Pollock and Maitland
tell us,
One thing our law would not do: the obvious thing. It would
exhaust its terrors in the endeavour to make the defendant appear,
but it would not give judgment against him until he had appeared,
and, if he was obstinate enough to endure imprisonment or out-
lawry, he could deprive the plaintiff of his remedy .... Our law
would not give judgment against one who had not appeared. 24
Holdsworth finds the origin of this attitude to be probably "the idea
that recourse to a law court depends upon the consent of the parties,""
a "consent" frequently obtained through duress. "Instead of saying to
the defaulter, 'I do not care whether you appear or not,' it sets its will
against his will: 'but you shall appear.' "20 Even Professor Ehrenzweig
adheres to this general view.27 It should be noted, however, that this
24. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 59l (2d cd. 1899)[hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MArrLAN6].
25. 2 HOLDSWORTH 105.
26. Id. Holdsworth seems to be paraphrasing Pollock and Maitland. See 2 POLLOCK :MAITLAND 295. See also R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICALPERSPECrIvE 361 (1952) [hereinafter cited as MILLAR]; Millar, The Formative Principles olCivil Procedure, 18 ILL. L. REV. 4 (1923); Sutherland, Mesne Process Upon Personal Actions
in the Early Common Law, 82 L.Q. REv. 482 (1966).
27. Early judicial procedure depended upon voluntary subjection of both parties tothe court's judgment. The Roman litiscontestatio, the medieval trial by ordeal, battle
and feud, as well as jurisdictional agreements in (primitive) modern international law,point to the universality of the consent technique. Later developments permitted the
courts to obtain consent by inducement and force, but apparently only a compara-
tively recent growth of the state's general functions has enabled administration ofjustice to proceed by self-asserted authority. Lack of self-reliance thus seems to havebeen the original source of the law's lasting insistence on at least symbolical sub.
mission to the court's jurisdiction.
Ehrenzweig 296-97.
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attitude of the courts was restricted to personal actions, and did not
apply to real actions,28
Except for an early thirteenth century practice noted by Bracton,9
quasi in rem actions in our sense of the term39 seem also to have been
unknown to the common law, even though (or perhaps partly because)
such jurisdiction was developed quite early in the local courts of a
number of cities and ports, including the most important, the Mayor's
Court of London.31
At common law, service of the original writ was accomplished by two
of the sheriff's messengers called "summoners," who gave a notice or
'"summons" to the defendant to appear in court at the return of the
original writ.32 Because no judgment by default would be rendered
against them for their disobedience of the summons, it is understand-
28. T. PLUcKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CormON LAW 886 (5th ed. 1956) [herein-
after cited as PLUCKNEIr].
29. This practice involved occasional default judgments in cases of debt. 2 POLLocK &
MAITLAND 594 n.5. In the same work, the authors say: "iT]he judgment by default in
debt (Note Book, p. 900) may be a sign that the action has been regarded as real." 14. 595
n.l. Plucknett, on the other hand, says:
There are no historical grounds fpr this view. Twelfth-century lawyers in the King'sCourt were not given to metaphysical speculation, but were just practical administra-
tors who saw a need for enforcing some of the commoner types of debt in the King's
Court. They propounded no theory of obligation; they said nothing about mutualgrants, consent, consideration or any other theory of contract. All the, did was to
establish a procedure for compelling debtors to pay their obvious dues.
PLUCENr 363.
30. For an excellent discussion of the problem see Avery v. Bender, 124 Vt. 309. 313,
204 A.2d 314, 317 (1964). Even the Restatement of Judgments uses "quasi in rein" in
two senses:
Proceedings quasi in rem are of two types. In the first type the plaintiff asserts aninterest in property and seeks to have his interest established as against the claim of
a designated person or designated persons. In this type are included actions to recover
possession of land or to establish the title to land, such as an action of ejectment, or
one to quiet title or to remove a cloud on title, where the court has jurisdiction to
give the relief asked because of its power over the land, even though it has no power
over the adverse claimant ....
In the second type of proceeding quasi in rem the plaintiff does not assert that hehas an interest in the property, but asserts a claim against the defendant personally,
and seeks to compel to the satisfaction of his claim the application of property of the
defendant by attachment or garnishment....
RMATE ENT OF JUDGmEms § 32, comment a at 128.29 (1942). It is in the Second =ense
of quasi in rem that we will use the term. In my teaching of jurisdiction, I prefer the
term "in the nature of in rem" when referring to the first kind of a case, e.g., ejectment
against a person over whom there is no personal jurisdiction. An "in rem" action then
becomes one whose purpose and effect is the affecting or deterpination of the status of a
res (or something we will allow ourselves to reify conceptually) as to the world at large.31. N. Levy, Studies in the History of Mesne Process and Provisional Security (un-
published J.S.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library). This study contains a com-
prehensive and up-to-date treatment of the subject of foreign attachment under the
custom of London. Another modem but brief summary is to be found in MILLAR 481.
For older accounts of foreign attachment see IV. BoIIuN, PRxVILucr LoNDoN (3d ed.1723); J. PULLING, CUSross OF LONDON (2d ed. 1849); T. SE.c.-r, Fomci, ArrAcumn-r(2d ed. 1840); J. LOcKE, FoamoN ATTACHMENT (1854); R. Monas, SELEr Cus OF THE
AyoR's CouRT OF NEw Yopx Crr 1674-1784, at 16 (1935).
32. 3 BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES0 279 [hereinafter cited as BLAcruoE].
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able that many defendants were less than prompt to obey it. Obedience
to the summons was "compelled" through the use of mesne process
of attachment, distringas, outlawry, and capias ad respondendum, but
the "one general characteristic [of mesne process] is its tedious for-
bearance. Very slowly it turns the screw which brings pressure to bear
upon the defendant. 33
If the summons was not obeyed, a writ of attachment (or pone, as
it was also known) issfied as a judicial or mesne writ, commanding the
sheriff to seize goods of the defendant or make the defendant find sure-
ties. The purpose was to compel or, more accurately, to induce a defen-
dant to appear in court, not to seize his property provisionally in aid
of any execution that might be forthcoming later.34 If after attachment
the defendant still did not appear, the goods attached would be for-
feited to the Crown and the sureties amerced (fined),38 leaving the
plaintiff without judgment for his debt.30 The failure of the defendant
to appear seems to have been considered more an affront to the King's
Court than to any principle of justice to the plaintiff.37 The same atti-
tude finds expression in cases of trespass vi et armis and of trespass
"against the peace," (it was, after all, the King's peace) such a deceit
and conspiracy, "where the violence of the wrong requires a more
speedy remedy," for attachment could issue therein without previous
summons of the defendant. 38
Except where capias ad respondendum or some other writ for arrest,
such as latitat or quo minus, was available, the failure of attachment to
procure the defendant's appearance left the plaintiff with but two fur-
ther remedies, distringas and outlawry. Under the writ of distringas,
the sheriff distrained goods and profits of the defendant's land, which
were forfeited to the King if the defendant did not appear.8 From the
plaintiff's point of view distringas thus suffered from the same defi-
ciency as attachment. It was distinguished from attachment chiefly in
that it reached a kind of property (profits of land) which was not
taken under attachment. Outlawry will be discussed in detail later.
33. 2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND 591.
34. Cf. Grimmett v. Barnwell, 184 Ga. 461, 192 S.E. 191 (1937); Watson v. Noblctt,
65 N.J.L. 506, 47 A. 438 (1900); Penoyar v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 44 N.E. 788 (1896).
35. 3 BLACKSTONE *280.
36. PLUCKNETT 386.
37. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 595.
38. 3 BLACKSTONE *280.
39. Id. The Parliamentary Privilege Act authorized the court to allow the sale of part
of the distrained property to defray the plaintiff's costs. 10 Geo. 3, c. 50 (1770). Cf. note
135 infra.
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B. Arrest Becomes the Leading Process
While the use of attachment and distringas as mesne processes soon
expanded into virtually all types of causes at common law, until later
times the remedy of arrest of the defendant was neither available in
every kind of case nor effective against defendants who could not be
found. At first, seizure of the defendant was allowed only in cases
involving injury accompanied with force (trespass vi et armis) wherein
the King's interest in punishing for breach of the peace outweighed
the feudal objections to an arrest and imprisonment which might de-
prive the debtor's lord of the debtor's personal services.40 It was this
basis for arrest that later provided the second of the tools-the first
was outlawry-with which process would be revolutionized long af-
ter the apogee of feudalism had been passed.
Because the history of the famous Bill of Middlesex has been set
forth by so many writers,41 I shall recount only enough of the familiar
story to put the process problem in perspective for our purposes. Most
writers blur the time element and fail to make adequate distinction
between jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the
person. The usual focus of interest has been upon the Bill of Middle-
sex procedure as a method whereby King's Bench perverted the action
of trespass in order to exercise jurisdiction over causes which normally
were the exclusive domain of Common Pleas. Passing mention has
been made of the fact that thereafter arrest became the usual mode of
beginning suit, but there has been inadequate appreciation of its nat-
ural result: that attachment would decline in frequency of use and
cease developing as a common law procedure in England. Little at-
tention has been paid to the reactions to the "frivolous and vexatious
arrests" 43 which took place regularly under the new procedure. The
most important were the eighteenth century development of in per-
sonam default judgments in personal actions based on summons
alone, in cases in which the defendant was served personally with
the summons, and the early nineteenth century procedure of "statu-
40. 3 BLACKSroNF 0281. This reluctance to interfere with feudal rights finds a parallel
in the early restrictions of execution to goods and chattels only under fieri facias. 2
PoLLocK & MAIrLAND 596; Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 435-36, 111 N.E. 70 (1916):
Hutcheson v. Grubbs, 80 Va. 251, 254 (1885).
41. 3 BLACK5TONE *285-88. For other expositions of the struggle for jurisdiction among
Common Pleas, King's Bench and Exchequer, see A. Scowr & S. Sisn'so., CIVIL POCED UmE
6-8 (1951); MILLAR 74-76; T. ATKINSON & J. CHADBOURN, CIVIL PRocEDuRE 8-10 (1948); 1
HoLDSWORTH 218-29; H. PorrR, HIsToRiCAL INTRODUCTIoN TO ENGLIsu LAW ANO ITS INSTI-
TUTIONS 127 (4th ed. A. Kirally 1958) [hereinafter cited as PorrR].
42. See MILLAR 74-76 for an outstanding exception.
43. An Act to Prevent Frivolous and Vexatious Arrests, 12 Geo. 1, c. 29 (1725) regulated
bail and other matters discussed herein.
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able" distringas and abode service of defendants who had "kept out
of the way to avoid service." 44 Each of these reactions will be seen to
have played an influential role in the history of mesne process.
King's Bench cooperated with parties who desired to circumvent
the ancient hold exercised by Common Pleas over the older personal
actions. At least as early as the first part of the fourteenth century,
the King's courts were hearing "bills based upon causes of action
arising in the county where the court happened at the time to be
sitting,"45 against persons "already within the jurisdiction of the
court."40 Thus a prisoner of such a court could be proceeded against
civilly without further preliminaries. In the middle of the fifteenth
century, by which time King's Bench had settled down in Middlesex
County, that court began to entertain bills against persons arrested
on fictitious charges of trespass vi et armis supposedly committed in
that county. What made this procedure especially efficient was that
persons so charged could be arrested anywhere in England and
brought within the custody of the Marshal of Marshalsea, the prison
of King's Bench. Defendants found in Middlesex County were ar-
rested on capias, while those found elsewhere were taken by a writ
of latitat,47 and brought within the custody of the Marshal.49 In 1692,
a statute even allowed jurisdiction to be based on delivery of declara.
tions to prisoners or their jailers in other jails. 49
As a result of these developments and other advantages to plaintiffs
in King's Bench, such as the availability of ejectment as an alternative
to the old real actions, most of the judicial business of Common Pleas
went over to King's Bench. 0 Even Exchequer attracted some of the
44. FIRST REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON THE PRACTICES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURTS OF COMMON LAW 87 (1829) [hereinafter cited as FinsT REIont].
45. PLUCKNEI 386; cf. POTTER 127.
46. PLUCKNETT 172; cf. POTraR 127.
47. 3 BLACKSTONE *286. Latitat got its name from the allegation therein, directed to the
sheriff of a county other than Middlesex, apprising him that the defendant "latitat ct
discurrit," that is, lurks and wanders about, in the county to which the writ was directed,
and ordering the sheriff to arrest him. Id.
48. PLUCKNETr 172, 886; POTrER 127-28.
49. An Act for Delivering Declarations to Prisoners, 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 21 (1692). Tills
law also regulated judgments nil dicit against such defendants. An interesting discussion
of this statute is found in THE PRACTICAL PART OF THE LAW 58 (corr. ed, 1695) (also
entitled THE COMPLEAT ArORNEY AND SOLICITOR). See also Rules, Orders, and Notices, in
the Court of King's Bench [hereinafter cited as Rules, K.B.], Easter, 5 W, & M., Ragg, 2 & 3
(1693), in COOKE, COMMON PLEAS (1742).
50. During the same period the action of ejectment became available for the purpose
of trying title to land. Whereas the older and cumbersome real actions were the exclusive
domain of Common Pleas, ejectment could be brought In all three of the Royal Courts.
"[T]he marked declension of the business of the Common Pleas, as compared with that
of the King's Bench, must be dated from the virtual supersession of the real actions by
the action of ejectment." 7 HoL nswoRTH 9.
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matters that formerly had been tried in Common Pleas, by expanding
its use of the writ of quo minus and predicating its jurisdiction upon
the theory (which degenerated into a fiction) that by failing to pay his
debt the defendant had rendered the plaintiff less able to pay a debt
owed the King. Common Pleas recaptured some of its former busi-
ness by using the writ of capias in connection with a charge of tres-
pass quare clausum fregit. Thus, by the latter part of the sixteenth
century, the arrest of defendants under writs of capias (in Common
Pleas), latitat (in King's Bench) and quo minus capias (in Exchequer)
was the way in which most personal actions were begun."" Although
the vexation of defendants and the loss of revenue to the Crown
(through the decline in purchases of original writs from Chancery)
elicited attempts at change during the seventeenth century,52 by 1683
such proceedings were matters of course in all three superior courts5
Summons continued to be a theoretical prerequisite to arrest (ex-
cept in cases of trespass vi et armis), the rationale given by Blackstone
being that the defendant, "not having obeyed the original summons,
... had shown a contempt of the court, and was no longer to be trusted
at large."54 As was so often the case with common law procedures, this
"contempt" eventually became fictitious, and the capias, latitat, or quo
minus came to be issued without any actual summoning of the defen-
dant.55
51. See 9 HoLDswoRTH 250; MLzLAR 75-76. "iT]he Latitat is like to Doctor Gifford's
water, which serues for all diseases, and so it holds one forme in all cases and actions
whatsoeuer.... ." T. Pow.LL, THE ATORNEY's ACADEmY 166 (1630).52. In 1626 Common Pleas reacted against such a perversion of its process and promul-
gated an order, "That no Attorney or Clerk of this Court hereafter shall sue forth a Writ
of Trespass vi et armis, where the true cause of Action Is debt... ; And that no Attorney
or Clerk by consent or composition shall take a declaration in Debt, his Clyent being
arrested upon an Action of Trespass vi et armis; or shall take a Declaration for anygreater debt than for which the Defendant was arrested .... " Rules, Orders, and Noticesin the Court of Common Pleas [hereinafter cited as Rules, C.P.], Hil. 2 Car. 1 (1626), inCooE, COMMON PLEAS (1742). This rule was succeeded, in 1661, by a famous statutedrastically limiting the plaintiffs right to require special bail unless the writ expressed
the true cause of action against the defendant. An act for prevention of vexations and
oppressions by arrests and of delays in fruits of law, 13 Car. 2, Stat. 2, c. 2. This act was
intended to require plaintiffs to take out original writs from Chancery in order to get
special bail, but the attorneys of King's Bench circumvented it by adding an "ac eliam"
clause (meaning "and also') to the latitat and stating the true cause of action therein.Until soon after the appointment of North as Chief Justice of Common Pleas in 1675.
the attorneys of that court were required by Chief Justice Vaughn's rule to take out
original writs. They looked on in helpless frustration as "the Incroachments of the King'sBench" continued. After the death of Vaughn, Common Pleas developed its ow-n. counter-part of the ac etiam in an unsuccessful attempt to recover "its ancient Splandour." For
a fascinating account written by one who lived through the period, see TitE Co.e PLPTSoLicrroR, ENuMiG-CtnR AN .'D ATrORNEY 64-69 (1683) [hereinafter cited as TiE Co.4wLEAT
SoLcrroa].
53. THE COmPLEAT SoucrroR 66, 67.
54. 3 BLAcsroNE 0287.
55. Id.
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C. The Development of Special Bail Procedures
In 1444, a statute was enacted which permitted the defendant ar-
rested "in any action personal, or by cause of indictment of trespass"
to procure his release by executing a bail bond (later called "bail be-
low") 56 to the sheriff with "reasonable sureties of sufficient persons ...
upon condition written, that the said prisoner shall appear at the day
contained in the said writ . . . ."7 At this point we must consider the
distinction between bail below, executed by the defendant to the sher-
iff in order to procure his freedom until the time came for him to ap-
pear in court and thus confer jurisdiction over himself, 8 and bail
above, executed in court as the formal appearance itself. 9 Bail above,
or "bail to the action," as it was also called, was a recognizance whose
condition (in King's Bench) was that
You (calling the Bail by their Names) do jointly and severally
undertake, that if the Defendant (naming his Name) shall be con-
demned in this Action at the Suit of the Plaintiff (naming his
Name) he shall satisfy the Costs and Condemnation, or render
himself into the Custody of the Marshall of the Marshalsea of the
Court of King's Bench, or you will pay the Costs and Condemna-
tion for him.60
It should be noted that "condemnation" meant the damages adjudged
on behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant.
The Act of 1444 placed the sheriff between two fires. If he failed to
release the defendant upon tender of sufficient bail, the Act provided
for fine and liability to the defendant for treble damages. On the other
hand, the sheriff was liable to amercement (fine) should he not produce
the defendant's body at the appointed time and place.01 The release
56. Id. *290-92; 9 HOLDSWORTHi 253.
57. 23 Hen. 6, c. 10 (1444). See also 3 BLACKSTONE, app., no. III, § 5.
58. The fact that bail below was not an appearance, and thus did not authorize tile
plaintiff to deliver his declaration to the defendant, is shown by the matter quoted In
note 66 infra.
59. "The manner of appearing in the Kings-Bench, is to file a Bail, written In Parch-
ment with the Master of the Office .. " THE COMPLEAT SOLICITOR 302. In 1692, "[flor the
greater ease and benefit of all persons whatsoever, in taking the recognizances of special
bails upon all actions and suits depending, or to be depending, in any of the courts of
King's Bench, Common Pleas, or Exchequer at Westminster," it was enacted that such
special bails could be taken "in the country" by commissioners, thus formally eliminating
the need for a trip to Westminster for that purpose. "Act for Taking special bails In tile
country," 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 4 (1692), implemented by Rules, K.B., Trin. 8 W. 3, Reg. 3
(1696), and Rules, C.P., 5 V. & M. (1692).
60. Rules, K.B., Trin. 8 W. 3, Reg. 3 (1696). See also 3 BLACKSTONE 0291 & app., no. III,
§ 5; 9 HoLDsWoRTH 253. The right of those providing civil bail to discharge themselves
by surrendering the defendant is today found in state statutes. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-319 (1958).
61. Pickering's Case, 12 Mod. 447, 88 Eng. Rep. 1442 (K.B. 1701). See note 66 infra.
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of the defendant on bail constituted no defense to amercement, and
it therefore behooved the sheriff to take sufficient bail below for his
own indemnification.
The sheriff's liability to the plaintiff was another matter. Until the
late seventeenth century any bail, even insufficient bail, would protect
the sheriff from liability to the plaintiff in an action of trespass on the
case for an escape. Such actions were frequently and unsuccessfully
brought by plaintiffs when defendants did not appear to the action. 2
The persistence of such plaintiffs was finally rewarded in 1699 by a
decision that "if the sheriff takes insufficient bail, he is liable to an ac-
tion, as well as to amercements."6 3 The law had thus sung from the
illogical rule that even a patently insufficient bond (e.g., one for £40
in a suit for £100)64 would protect the sheriff from liability to the
plaintiff, to the almost opposite position that even a sufficient bail
bond-and one the sheriff was required to accept-would afford him,
at best, indemnity but not immunity. This latter position may be logi-
cal as far as his liability to the plaintiff is concerned, since the penalty
of the bail-piece65 below ran to the sheriff rather than to the plaintiff;
but it also left the sheriff subject to amercement by the Crown and to
the risk of loss of indemnity because of the insolvency of the bail oc-
curring after execution of the bail-piece.
Breach of the condition of the bail bond below gave the sheriff a
right of action against the defendant and his bail for recovery of his
amercements66 (and later for the recovery of losses through action by
62. See, e.g., Ellis v. Yarborough, I Mod. 227, 86 Eng. Rep. 846 (C.P., 1676); Posterne
v. Hanson, 2 Wims. Saund. 59, 85 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1669); Boles v. Lassels, Cro. Eliz. 852,
78 Eng. Rep. 1077 (KB. 1600); Barton v. Aldeworth, Cro. Eliz. 624, 78 Eng. Rep. 865(.B. 1598).
63. Ethericke v. Cooper, 1 Ld. Raym. 425, 91 Eng. Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1699) (Holt, C.J.).64. Barton v. Aldeworth, Cro. Eliz. 624, 78 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1598).
65. The bail piece was a formal entry or memorandum of the recognizance or under.
taking of special bail in civil actions, which, after being signed and acknowledged by
the bail before the proper officer, was filed in the court in which the action was pending.
66. When upon a Bill of Middlesex, Latitat, or any other Writ, the Defendant ordefendants be arrested, and have entered into Bond to the Sheriff for their appearance
according to the return of the Writ; then if the party or parties do not appear at the
return of the Writ, you must call to the Sheriff for a return of the Writ; and upon a
Cepi corpus returned, if the party do not appear at the return, you may give the Sheriff
a Rule to bring in his body on paid of forty shillings, &c, And then if he appear not,you may have a Habeas Corpus upon the Cepi corpus.... And if the Sheriff will not
return this Writ of Habeas Corpus, you may amerce him as before; or if he returnLanguidus in prisona, you may have upon that a Duces tecum licet languidus, &c.At the return of all or any of these, you may amerce the Sheriff, and he shall pay it,
after those Rules given in the Kings-Bench.
If you will estreat your Amerciaments into the Crown.Oftice, the charge of every
Rule estreated is two shillings four pence: and in this course you may both amerce theSheriff, and prosecute till such time as he doth appear: but if there be any great
amerciament, the Defendant will appear, so save himself from the Sheriffs Bond; and
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the plaintiff), whereas breach of the condition of the bail above gave
a right of action to the plaintiff for his damages and costs. Eventually,
possibly as late as the latter half of the seventeenth centuryo 7-when
so many plaintiffs' Tights seem to have developed-plaintiffs began to
take assignments of the bail bonds below from the sheriff and to en-
force them for their own benefit. In 1705, a statute made this a matter
of right on the part of the plaintiff. 8 Thus the plaintiff acquired an
election either to amerce the sheriff or to discharge him by taking an
assignment of the bail below. Whether the plaintiff ever received the
amercements is a matter of conjecture; 9 in any event, the new rights
of taking an assignment of bail bond and action against the sheriff
seem to have made this a moot question. By the early nineteenth cen-
tury the plaintiff's rights in these matters could be described as follows:
If bail are not put in within due time, or if within the four days
there is no justification nor any render of the defendant to cus-
tody, the plaintiff, though no longer able ... to proceed in his ac-
tion, has for his redress an option of proceeding either against the
sheriff or the bail below. If he elects the former method, he ob-
tains certain rules of Court calling on the sheriff, the first to re-
turn the writ, and the second to bring in the body of the defen-
dant, and on his failure to do so, may obtain, in a summary way
by motion, an attachment against him for the whole debt and
costs. If on the other hand he chooses to proceed against the bail,
after the amerciaments are returned into the Crown-Office, if they be not certified and
returned into the Exchequer, which is once in every half year, where they are estreated
before that time, if you be sued upon the Sheriffs Bond, you may upon motion of the
Court, if the Plaintiffs Attorney (to whose Client the Sheriffs Dond is commonly as.
signed,) will not consent otherwise, that you are contented to appear as of the same
Term the first Writ was returnable, and to accept of a Declaration, and not to delay
the Plaintiff in his Suit; the Court will usually order the suit upon the Sheriffs Bond
to stay, or if the amerciaments be estreated, then upon the same offer, and also to
take off those amerciaments, the court will order the like.
THE COMPLEAT SOLICITOR 301. Cf. id. 85 (specific and parallel treatment of the same
problem in Common Pleas).
67. The instructions on amercement of sheriffs found in T. PowELL, TnE ArOURNv.Y'S
ACADEMY 99 (1630) and in THE FiLAcERS OFFiCE 21-24 ff. (1657) make no mention of
assignment of bail bonds as an alternative to amercement, whereas The Compleat Solicitor
says that the bond was "commonly assigned" to the plaintiff. THE CorPzLEAT SOLICITOR 301.
The bail-piece, which was retained by the sheriff, was assigned by the plaintiff's indorsing
thereon a promise to save the sheriff harmless against amercements. Case 861, Anonymous,
12 Mod. 516, 88 Eng. Rep. 1488 (1701); Case 888, Anonymous, 12 Mod. 527, 88 Eng. Rep.
1496 (1701).
68. An act for the amendment of the law, and the better advancement of justice,
4 Ann., c. 16, sched. 20 (1705).
69. Amercements were returned into the Crown Office (the criminal side of King's
Bench) and were estreated (certified) into the Exchequer every six months. It is possible,
but unlikely, that there arose a practice of allowing the plaintiff to receive the amerce-
ments just as he was able to receive the benefit of capias utlagatum. See Pinfold v. East-
India Co., 2 Lev. 49, 83 Eng. Rep. 444 (Ex. 1672). For a modem statute on assignment of
special bail below, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-318 (1958).
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he demands from the sheriff an assignment of the bail-bond, and
institutes an action upon it against the obligors .... In the event
of an attachment being obtained against the sheriff, he looks to
the bail or the defendant for his indemnity; and if the bail are
compelled to pay, they are also entitled to claim reimbursement
from the defendant, as it was on his account that they incurred
the liability.70
A concomitant of this state of affairs was a bizarre practice reported
in the early nineteenth century by which the sheriff would assign his
fee in the case to his under-sheriff in consideration of the under-sher-
iff's agreement to indemnify him as to loss sustained by him through
the plaintiff's action-the fee being analogous to an insurance pre-
mium paid by the sheriff for his own protection. The under-sheriff
would enter into a similar arrangement with the bailiff who actually
executed the process of arrest. The bailiff, in turn, would exact a fee
from the defendant sufficient to cover his risk in accepting the partic-
ular sureties proffered by the defendant for his release.-,
By making the sheriff personally responsible that bail above shall
be perfected, or the defendant rendered, it amply consults at all
events the security of the plaintiff; while on the other hand, the
defendant, by making his bargain with the arresting officer, may
procure almost any extent of accommodation as to the acceptance
of the bail which he offers, and may even avoid the necessity of
finding bail at all; nothing being more common than for the offi-
cer to accept (in consideration of a gratuity) the undertaking of
the defendant's attorney, or even the defendant's own verbal en-
gagement. The arrest and discharge in this manner frequently
take place without the slightest personal inconvenience to the
party arrested, and with the greatest privacy.72
Another practice, provided for by statutes73 permitted the defendant
to obtain his release in bailable cases by posting a cash deposit of the
amount demanded, plus additional sums for costs. Upon such deposit,
the defendant was required to enter a common appearance. If he failed
to do so, the plaintiff could enter it for him. If the plaintiff received
judgment in the action, the cash deposit was to be paid over to him in
satisfaction. In cases in which it appeared that the plaintiff had lacked
reasonable cause to have the defendant arrested, the defendant was
awarded costs.74
70. F isr RE 'rT 103 (1829).
71. Id. 105, 106.
72. Id. 106.
73. 43 Geo. 3, c. 46 (1803); Imprisonment for Debt Act, 7 & 8 Gco. 4, c. 71 (1827).
74. 43 Geo. 3, c. 46 (1803).
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Finally, as a result of the events described below, civil arrest on
mesne process-except in one situation-was abolished in 1838.7"
D. Common Bail and the Development of Default Judgments Based
on Mere Summoning of the Defendant
The harshness of arresting a defendant on trumped-up charges and
forcing him to raise bail, especially in small cases, brought about the
development of procedures which helped to mitigate the rigors of the
arrest system. At least as early as 1582 in Common Pleas70 and possibly
earlier in King's Bench, 77 defendants in smaller cases78 were allowed
to put in "common bail" above and below, meaning bail with ficti-
tious sureties,79 as distinguished from "special bail," which required
actual sureties. The term "nonbailable" was used to refer to those
cases in which the plaintiff was not entitled to require special bail,
but had to content himself with common bail. "Nonbailable" is a mis-
leading word, however, not only because of its different meaning in
criminal law, 0 but also because the actual filing of bail above was re-
quired even in so-called nonbailable cases, albeit bail with the ficti-
tious sureties Doe and Roe. Bail above, being the formality required
for entry of appearance of any defendant not in the actual or construc-
tive custody of the marshal, was considered essential to the jurisdiction
of the court, and its entry on the record was necessary to the validity of
75. 1 & 2 Vic. c. 110, §§ 1, 3 (1838). Section 3 permitted arrest of the defendant upon
order of a judge in any case involving £20 or more where "there was probable cause for
believing that the defendant . . . [was] . . . about to quit England unless he . . . [was]
forthwith apprehended .. " The statute also greatly enlarged the scope of execution
process and created a judgment lien upon realty.
76. "[I]n all other Actions personal where the debt or damages loth not amount to
Twenty pounds, the Defendant to be admitted to Common Bayle to be taken and entered
only by the Officer from whence the Process upon which the Defendant shall so appear
did issue, and by none other .... " Rules, C.P., Trin. 24 Eliz. (1582). The foregoing refers
to a practice whereby the sheriff retained the judicial writ (capias, latitat, etc.) In hIs
office and issued his own warrant to the bailiff who actually made the arrest. See M.
HASTINGS, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 163 (19.17).
This practice was regulated by the rule that "no Sheriff or Sheriffs Deputy, shall deliver
or make, or cause or suffer to be delivered or made, any Warrant or Warrants before the
Writ or Writs be duly sued forth and delivered to the said Sheriffs or their Deputies
respectively." Rules, C.P., Hil. 14 & 15 Car. 2 (1662).
77. Gilbert quotes "The old Rule in the Compleat Attorney, printed in 1676, Jo. 45,"
to the effect that such a practice was followed "antiently." GILBERT, CIVIL ACTiONS IN TiHEt
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 34, 35 (1761).
78. "Smaller" cases were those under £20 or, later, those under £ 10 as well as those
in which the damages were too uncertain or "precarious" for the plaintiff to swear that
they exceeded such sum. The amount went back up to £20 in the 19th century. See note
76 supra; THE FILAcERs OFFICE 27 (1657); THE COMPLEAT ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR 314
(corr. ed. 1695); 3 BLACR5TONE *292; Frivolous Arrest Act, 12 Geo. 1, c. 29 (1725), and
the later statutes cited in note 84 infra.
79. 3 BLACKSTONE *287; 9 HOLDSwORTH 253.
80. In criminal law, a nonbailable case is one in which the defendant has no right
to be released on bail pending trial.
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the plaintiff's judgment."' The King's Bench Rules of 169282 indicate
that the upsetting of plaintiffs' causes because of the failure of the de-
fendant to file common bail above was a current problem.
The Frivolous Arrest Act of 172583 empowered the plaintiff to enter
common bail above or a "common appearance" for the defendant in
nonbailable cases, meaning cases in superior courts in which the sum
sued for was under ten pounds. Authorizing the plaintiff to effectuate
the defendant's appearance by putting in common bail above for him
in those cases in which the defendant had been served with a copy of
the writ must have seemed a significant step to practitioners raised in
the tradition that no declaration or judgment could be delivered until
the defendant either was in custody or had put in his own appearance.
The historical importance of this new plaintiffs' right, however, is that
it marks the practical transition from arrest to summons in lhe begin-
ning of personal civil actions in the superior courts.8 4
The Frivolous Arrest Act also provided that if
... any writ or process shall issue for the sum of ten pounds or
upwards, and no affidavit and indorsement shall be made as afore-
said, the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall not proceed to arrest the body
of the defendant or defendants, but shall proceed in like manner,
as is by this act directed in cases where the cause of action does not
amount to the sum of ten pounds... as aforesaid. 5
The plaintiff suing for £10 or more could, by making affidavit of the
sum due, have the defendant arrested as before. Once he had elected
to proceed in such a manner, however, he bore the risk that, if the bail
above should be rejected or fail to "justify," i.e., prove their sufficiency
as sureties when formally called upon to do so, "there can be no decla-
ration or farther prosecution of the suit; and the plaintiff has no course
left but to abandon his action, and institute a new proceeding against
the sheriff or against the bail below .... ,s
81. Dennis v. Mannaring, Poph. 146, 79 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1617) (see note 94 infra
for discussion of dictum that a defendant might be required to enter bail in order to
make a plaintiff's judgment valid). See also W. STYES, PRAcrcAL Rrcis 77, 203 (1707).
82. Rules, K.B., Trin. 4 W. & M. (1692). See also id., Trin. 1. Geo. 2 (1727).
83. 12 Geo. 1, c. 29. This basic statute was amended and its life extended a number of
times: 5 Geo. 2, c. 27 (1752); 21 Geo. 2, c. 3 (1748); 19 Geo. 3, c. 70 (1779); 43 Geo. 3, c. 46
(1803); 51 Geo. 3, c. 124 (1811); 57 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1817); 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71 (1827).
84. Such a transition simply and forthrightly occurred in Plymouth Colony in 1644,
while the mother country still was struggling with the niceties and complexities of bail.
Act of June 5, 1644, Plymouth Colony. "That it shalbe lawfull for the Gounor and
Majestrats or any of them to direct a summons to any pson within the Goument to
answere to any suits comenced against them. and it shalbe as authenticall as if it were
donn by warrant to attach or arrest them."
85. 12 Geo. 1, c. 29, § 2 (1725).
86. Fnwr REPoRT 90. The reader who would dismiss our concern with special bail as
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It is a central contention of this article that the Frivolous ArreSt Act
of 1725, although in part a codification of prior practice, originated
the plaintiff's right to enter common bail for his defendant: that, prior
to 1725, there was no such option open to a plaintiff whose defendant
refused to appear or to consent to an appearance being made for him.8 7
Proof of a negative is almost always difficult-particularly so when the
issues in question are buried in the past and involved with a literature
that is partly a recital of actualities and partly a formalistic recording
of fictitious events. The student of the common law must deal with
probabilities, carefully weighing the inferences to be drawn from
such available evidence as appears to be grounded in reality.
Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence against the existence of
a plaintiffs' right, prior to 1725, to avoid the delays and dangers of tile
full and formal bail procedure by simply entering common bail them-
selves for defendants, is the complete failure of the practitioners' texts
of the period to mention any such possibility.88 Such a right, if avail-
able, would have been of obvious importance to plaintiffs and their
attorneys, and could hardly have escaped mention in the practical
handbooks of the day.
Nor have I been able to find a pre-1725 case setting forth such a
practice in England. In fact, a case as late as 1718 illustrates the impo-
tence of the courts of law to render judgment for a plaintiff against a
non-appearing defendant-even one put "out of the protection of the
law" by outlawry upon mesne process. In Balch v. Wastall8 the plain-
tiff, being owed money by bond, procured the outlawry of the defen-
dant upon mesne process. Because the defendant was entitled to an an-
nuity from personalty held in trust for him by one C, plaintiff brought
a bill in chancery to subject this annuity to the payment of the bond.
The plaintiff argued that, since he "had gone as far as he could at law,
and was hindered by the contempt of the defendant, and this being a
matter of trust, and a creature of equity, the plaintiff ought rather to
moot is directed to the statutes of Connecticut which preserve, in cases begun by "body
attachment," the old procedures of bail below executed to the arresting officer and bail
above filed with the clerk of court as the entry of appearance by the defendant. CONN.
GEN. STAT §§ 52-312 to 52-319 (1958). CONN. PRAc. BK. § 40 (1963).
87. Pollock and Maitland, writing in the late nineteenth century, and Millar, in the
mid-twentieth, seem to agree with this conclusion. POLLOCK & MAITLAND 591951 MILLAR
361. Nevertheless, particularly in the face of Ehrenzweig's contrary opinion, it is worth
examining the available evidence in greater detail than has heretofore been attempted.
88. See generally T. PowELL, THE ATroURNEY's ACADEMy (1630); T. G. oF STAPLE INNV,
THE ATrORNEY OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAs (1642); THE FILACERS OFFICE (1657); TllE
COMPLEAT SOLICITOR, THE PRACTICE PART OF THE LAW (corr. ed. 1695); TnE PRA cK PART
OF THE LAW (ed. 1711).
89. 1 Peere Wins. 445, 24 Eng. Rep. 465 (Ch. 1718).
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be relieved here, than sent to another court ...." Although the court
denied the relief sought, it did not deny that the plaintiff had gone as
far as he could at law. Rather, the court observed that
by the outlawry all the defendant's interest, as well equitable as
legal, was forfeited to the Crown; and though the plaintiff was en-
titled to a grant thereof from the Crown, which upon application
to the Court of Exchequer, he would of course have, yet, since this
trust continued in the Crown until taken out, they directed the
plaintiff to get such grant, and make the Attorney-General a party,
and then to come again.
The suggested application to the Court of Exchequer is not a further
judicial proceeding at law, but is instead an application for adminis-
trative relief from the Exchequer, as the minister concerned with the
King's revenue, for a grant which was not formally a matter of legal
right.
Just as the practitioners' texts mentioned above were concerned
with actual practice, so were the Rules of Court and the reports reflec-
tions of actuality-in contrast with the fictions often found in the for-
mal records of proceedings. 0 We have seen that the sixteenth century
practice of common bail described in the Rules of Common Pleas,01 as
well as the "antient" practice of the same in King's Bench described
by Gilbert,9 2 permitted the defendant to file common bail in order to
obtain relief from the burden of arrest in small cases. There is persua-
sive evidence that this privilege was for the defendant's relief alone,
and was not one to be exercised by the plaintiff for his own advantage,
except in certain special situations where, in effect, the defendant had
consented to such entry of bail on his behalf.
An important series of developments grew out of irregular practices
found in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century sources de-
scribed below. Plaintiffs' attorneys, sometimes because they were lulled
90. A frank recognition of the fictitiousness of certain entries of record Is given by
Powell:
For as the Capias hath an original Writ to goe before it? [sic] So the latilat supposeth
and pretendeth a Bill of Middlesex to lead it also, For that is granted in the Kings
Bench, because it is intended that the Defendant vpon retume of a Bill of Middle-
sex precedent doth Latitare in valluatur, &c.
But the Original must containe the true cause of action, and be exactly set downe
and drawn, that all the following Processe and proceeding, may be tyed to agree with
it punctuatin.
T. POWELL, TnE ATrouRNEY's AcADEm 166 (1630).
91. See note 76 supra.
92. Gxiimzr, supra note 77, at 35.
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by the promises of defendants' attorneys to appear 3 for their clients,
were accepting responsive pleadings and even going to trial without
having seen to it that their defendants had put in the bail that was a
necessary part of the record to support the court's jurisdiction over the
defendant.0 4
In 1657, King's Bench promulgated a rule "For the Preventing of
many Inconveniences which daily happen to the Plaintiffs by the De-
fendants omitting the filing of Common Bails, according to the ancient
Usage and Course of the Court." This rule ordered
[t]hat all Clerks of the Office, Philizars and Attorneys at large, do
within ten Days after the end of every Term, deliver to the Secon-
dary, a Note of all such Appearances as have been made unto
them the Term before, and by whom they were made; so that he
that is appointed to enter the Bails, may see whether Bails be filed
for every such Appearance or not.95
93. It is worth heading off a troublesome semantic problem at this point. Unfortu-
nately, the word "appearance" has two meanings in the materials we must next examine,
It continues to be used in the strict sense of a formal submission to the court's jurisdic-
tion, but we also find the same word used to refer to the act of physically showing tip in
court, sometimes irregularly as previously noted. A good example of such double use of
the word "appearance" is the following:
There can be no appearance in this Court but either by special or common Bail,
for it is the putting in of Bail that attacheth the Cause in Court. 7 Maij, 1650. B.S.
If an Attorney promiseth to appear for his Client, the Court will compel him to
put in common Bail for him. For the promise to appear implies the other.
If the Attorney appears for his Client, but de bene esse, that is, if his Client shall
like and approve of it; if his Client shall refuse to appear, he may in some short time
afterwards return the Declaration to the Plaintiffs Attorney, with his answer, that
his Client will not appear, and then he is not bound to plead unto it, 14 Nov. 1650
B.S. For this was not an absolute, but a conditional appearance.
W. STYLE, STYLE's PRACTICAL REGISTER 79 (1707).
94. In Dennis v. Mannaring, Pop. 146, 79 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1617), It was the
plaintiff who benefited from the absence of an entry of bail for the defendant. In that
case the plaintiff was "not bound to stand to the verdict" since there was a want of
jurisdiction over the defendant. In the report of the case Doderidge, J., is reported as
saying:
I have seen in this Court, where, upon a writ of error brought in such a case, we
have compelled him to put in his bail, because he should not take advantage of his
own folly: but because that here no fraud appeared to be in the plaintiff, he shall not
be bound to stand to the verdict...
Since Dennis itself involved, as the reporter put it, a "great case between" the parties, and
since the dispute was over entry of verdict, it appears that the defendant had participated
in the trial. Likewise, Doderidge's comparison of Dennis with his remembered instance,
and the fact that the former case involved a writ of error (which always comes after judg.
ment), strongly suggest that the defendant had participated in the action rather than
resisting jurisdiction from the outset. The two cases may be reconciled as follows: In the
earlier case the court refused to vacate a judgment formally entered against a defendant
who had committed the "folly" of not entering bail, but who had otherwise fully appeared.
In Dennis the court, not yet having proceeded to judgment, refused to enter judgment
against a plaintiff when the defendant had not put in bail. Thus, Doderidge's recollected
case, if correctly reported by him, appears to be an early instance in which a defendant
was deemed to consent to jurisdiction through his acts in connection with the case. Other
instances are discussed later in the text.
95. Rules, K.B., East., 9 Car. 2 (1657).
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In 1661, King's Bench ordered
[t]hat every Attorney of this Court who shall put in any Bail by
Recognizance before the Chief Justice or any of the other Justices
of this Court, and the Plaintiff or his Attorney shall accept of such
Bail, that then the Attorney who puts in such Bail shall cause that
Bail to be filed within twenty Days after such acceptance under
the Penalty of 40s. and that all Bails now taken de bene esse and
which are accepted by the Plaintiff's Attorney and now remaining
with any Judge of this Court, shall likewise be filed within twenty
Days now next following, on the like Penalty of 40s. 0
In 1664, a further rule of King's Bench ordered
that every Attorney of this Court, who shall appear for any Defen-
dant in any Action in which special Bail is not required, shall file
common Bail for such Defendant within six Days next after the
end of the same Term of which he appeared.
9 7
No reference at all is made to entry of common bail by the plaintiff
for the defendant, in case the defendant should fail to do so.
In spite of the foregoing rules and orders, plaintiffs must have con-
tinued to have trouble with defendants who failed to put in bail, for
we find, in 1689, the Court of King's Bench ordering
[t]hat for every Judgment acknowledged by Warrant of Attorney,
Bail shall be filed for the Defendant to Warrant such Judgment,
or in Default thereof the Attorney who ought to file the said Bail,
shall forfeit and pay to the Court Box 10s. for every such Bail not
filed. And for every other Common Bail which ought to be filed,
and is not filed, the Attorney for the Defendant shall forfeit and
pay to the Box of the Court 10s. And the same respective Attor-
neys shall be punished as to the Justices of the Court shall seem
meet.98
In 1692, a Rule of Court of King's Bench was promulgated which
observed once again that the neglect of clerks and attorneys of the
court to file common bails operated "to the great Danger of the Plain-
tiffs," and the court ordered
that every Clerk and Attorney of this Court, who shall be an At-
torney for the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff's Attorney upon
joining of every issue Is. 6d. for common Bail, unless the said At-
torney for the Defendant shall make it appear to the Plaintiff's At-
torney that common or special Bail is filed.
96. Rules, K.B., Trin. 13 Car. 2 (1661) (footnotes omitted).
97. Rules, K.B., Mich. 16 Car. 2 (1664) (footnotes omitted).
98. Rules, K.B., Hil. 1 W. 8= M. (1689) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
The Yale Law Journal
And it is further Ordered, that every Clerk for the Plaintiff on
his Account for his Entries shall pay to the Secondary of this
Court the Is. 6d. so by him received, and that every Clerk and
Attorney who shall act contrary to this Rule in any Behalf, shall
respectively forfeit 10s. for every such Default, to be paid to the
Box of this Court.99
Although this last rule implies that the plaintiff could cause common
bail to be entered for the defendant, it should be noted that this was
after joining of issue and payment of the filing fee for bail, both of
which clearly imply consent by the defendant that bail be entered for
him.
The Rule of King's Bench of 1692 cited above contains an addi-
tional provision which can easily be misconstrued as evidence of a
power in the plaintiff to effect an appearance for a defaulting defen-
dant. After the above language, the Rule went on to provide that
all Clerks and Attorneys for the plaintiff upon signing of Judg-
ment by Default, or on Non Sum Informatus, shall pay to the Sec-
ondary of this Court Is. 6d. for the common Bail, unless it was be-
fore filed, and the said is. 6d. shall be allowed the Plaintiff in his
Costs.100
It has been noted that the promise of the defendant's attorney to ap-
pear could be enforced as an appearance by the defendant,' 1 and that
the defendant could consent to entry of bail by paying the fee therefor
to the plaintiff, In an age of concern over the "danger" to the plaintiff's
cause (and to the revenue of the Secondary of the Court) if bail were
not put in by defendants, it is quite natural that the court should ex-
pand the number of situations in which it would infer consent of the
defendant to the entry of his bail (and payment of his fee) by the plain-
tiff. The last-quoted portion of the rule of 1692 apparently reflects
such an expansion based upon consent to jurisdiction inferred from
the defendant's taking steps in the cause rather than resisting jurisdic.
tion from the outset. In fact, this seems to be the common principle
running through all three situations treated by the 1692 rule. Judg.
ment on non sum informatus fits in almost as naturally as does the pay-
ment of the bail fee to the plaintiff, for it is a judgment based upon an
announcement in court, or plea, by the attorney for the defendant that
99. Rules, K.B., Trin. 4 W. & M. H (1692) (footnotes omitted).
100. Id.
101. See note 93 supra. There is evidence, however, that enforcement of such pronlies
was restricted to situations in which an original writ had been issued. See, e.g., Tl1E
FmAcEas OFicmm 30 (1657); Case 54, Anonymous, 6 Mod. 42, 87 Eng. Rep. 804 (K.D. 1703).
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he is not informed of any answer to be given by him, usually pursuant
to a previous agreement between the parties .10 2 "Judgment by default"
is best understood by first noting that the term "default" was used to
refer to the defendant's failure to act after appearance as well as his
failure to appear at all.10 3 Stephen points out the traditional difference
between real actions and personal actions in the matter of defaults be-
fore appearance:
Thus, in a real (though not in a personal) action, if the defendant
holds out against the process, judgment may be given against him
for default of appearance, . . So, in actions real, mixed, or per-
sonal, if after appearance he neither pleads nor demurs, or if after
plea he fails to maintain his pleading till issue joined, by rejoinder,
rebutter, &c., judgment will be given against him for want of plea,
which is called judgment nil dicit.04
Stephen then states that he will give an example of a "judgment by
default,"'0 5 which turns out to be a judgment "nil dicit."'' 00 This is
quite consistent with a passage in The Compleat Solicitor in which
the terms "nihil dicit" and "judgment by default" are used as syno-
nyms. The first term is used to refer to judgment entered when no
plea is pleaded after an appearance and imparlance by the defendant.
The latter is used to refer to a judgment entered for a plaintiff after a
defendant had neither joined issue nor demurred to the plaintiff's tra-
verse of the defendant's plea.0 7
It thus appears that the rule of 1692 was not an introduction of a
completely new concept of jurisdiction based upon mere summoning
of a resisting defendant, but was, as suggested, an expansion of the
principle of jurisdiction based upon the express or implied consent of
the defendant to the putting in of his bail.
102. H. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 136 (3d American ed. 1895); BLAcns LAW
DICTIONARY 1205 (4th ed. 1951).
103. The following passage illustrates the use of "default" both in a post-appearnce
setting and in connection with the entry of judgment as a result of such default:
The Imparlance is a Time of Leave, or License given from one Term to the Term
succeeding by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, either to plead to his Action brought,
or to let it pass by Default; and to that Purpose, the next Term after the Imparlance
had, as aforesaid, the Attorney for the Plaintiff may call to the Attorney of the
Defendant to answer to the Declaration, and if he do not plead in due Time, give
him Rule to answer; which done, and the Rule expired, he may enter Judgment as
before is declared by Nihil Dici4
Tm PRAcnc PART OF THE LAw 44 (1711).
104. H. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLEs OF PLEADING 135-0 (3d American cd. 1895).
105. Id. 139.
106. Id. 140.
107. THE COmPLEAT SOLICroR 336 (1683). See also 3 BLAC.F0sNE '296, where he ues
"judgment by default" and "judgment nihil dicit" as synon)ms.
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The one other instance, prior to 1725, in which common bail was
put in by someone other than the defendant or his attorney, only em-
phasizes the necessity for obtaining the defendant's consent to bail. In
a 1616 case in King's Bench108 entry of common bail was made by or-
der of the court upon a showing that the defendant's attorney, having
been paid his fee for entering common bail, had died before he could
enter it. Had the plaintiff been privileged to enter common bail as a
matter of course, independent of the wishes of the defendant, no such
showing would have been required before bail was entered.
The first unequivocal reference in the Rules of Court to the entry of
bail by the plaintiff for a totally non-appearing defendant, who had
done nothing (such as paying his attorney his fee for entering common
bail) to consent to entry of bail, appears in 1727,109 and refers to the
Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725. The timing of this initial reference in
the Rules of Court is particularly significant in light of the care with
which the earlier rules, described above, had dealt with the details of
contemporary bail procedure.
The Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725 marked an important change from
earlier practice."" The statute was entitled "An act to prevent frivo-
lous and vexatious arrest," and it achieved its purpose, not by permit-
ting an arrested defendant to enter common bail in smaller cases gen-
erally and in larger cases in which the plaintiff had waived special bail,
but by replacing arrest in such cases with service of a copy of the writ
on the defendant and by expressly authorizing the plaintiff to enter
bail for the defendant.
Thus the evidence I have found of a pre-1725 practice of permitting
the plaintiff to effect the defendant's appearance through filing com-
mon bail for him is slight indeed. The only situations found in which
common bail was entered by other than the defendant or his attorney
have, I believe, been shown to be perfectly consistent with the view
that plaintiffs were not, before 1725, permitted to file bail for defen-
dants without their consent. In one instance, the defendant's attorney
had promised to appear."' In another case, the defendant obviously
had consented to entry of bail by paying his attorney to do so;"-" in the
108. Denham v. Cumber, I Rolle 372, 81 Eng. Rep. 543 (K.B. 1616), translated from
the French in 3 Vin. Abr. 464.
109. Rules, K.B., Trin. 1 Geo. 2 (1727).
110. 12 Geo. 1, c. 29.
111. See pp. 71-72 supra.
112. Denham v. Cumber, I Rolle 372, 81 Eng. Rep. 543 (KX. 1616), translated from
the French in 3 Vin. Abr. 464.
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other, the entry- of bail pursuant to Rule of Court applied to defend-
ants who were already in court." 3
Despite appearances to the contrary, Holdsworth does not contradict
this interpretation of the creation of the plaintiff's right to effect ap-
pearances for non-appearing defendants. A reading of Holdsworth's
text without analysis of the accompanying footnotes can lead one to
conclude erroneously that he views the arrest of defendants during this
period as entirely fictitious and that he states unequivocally that this
fictitious arrest was accompanied by entry of bail by the plaintiff for
the defendant prior to 1725. In fact Holdsworth asserts neither of
these views. After detailing the fictitious character of the Bill of Mid-
dlesex, he states:
If [the defendant] did not appear to the bill or the latitat he was
liable to be arrested for contempt of court in not appearing. But
as all the proceedings were fictitious, the contempt would seem to
share the fictitious character. To arrest a man for a merely ficti-
tious contempt was clearly a hardship.114
A reading of Holdsworth's note to this passage reveals that by "all the
proceedings were fictitious," he was referring to all the proceedings
(with the exception of the latitat itself) prior to the "contempt," and
not to the arrest itself, for the note says: "Many statutes were passed
to free defendants sued by this process from this liability to arrest, 12
George I. c. 29 .. . . [and later statutes]."' " Had the arrests been ficti-
tious, the statutes would have been unnecessary. Even as late as 1829
arrest was a very real and important matter. The Parliamentary Com-
missioners reported that, during the five years of 1823 through 1827,
when 398,464 actions were brought in the superior courts at Westmin-
ster, 162,263 of which were bailable, there were 39,962 cases in which
special bail was put in and 17,059 cases in which defendants remained
prisoners in custody of sheriffs on mesne process. The "large majority"
of the remaining 105,242 defendants "against whom process of arrest
is taken out are driven by it to immediate payment or terms of com-
promise, and either avoid any commitment to actual custody, or ob-
tain a speedy discharge.""16
Holdsworth's main text continues:
Therefore, in the event of non-appearance, the plaintiff was al-
113. See p. 74 & note 99 supra.
114. 1 HoswoRTH 220.
115. Id. n-5.
116. Fntsr REPoRT 71, 156, 202, 203 (1829).
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lowed to enter an appearance for him, and to give as sureties for
his appearance his friends John Doe and Richard Roe. This was
called giving "common bail."1 7
Several comments are in order. First, Holdsworth-as is characteristic
of much historical writing about this problem-does not say just when
the plaintiff first acquired the right to enter a common appearance for
the defendant. Second, although his text when read straight through
without attention to the footnotes does give one the false impression,
he does not state that this right originated outside the statutes. Third,
the only authority he cites in support of the above passage is as follows:
"Coke, Fourth Instit. 72; Bl. Comm. iii 287."118 An examination of
Blackstone reveals him to be ambiguous as to the origin of the right of
the plaintiff to enter common bail for the defendant. He says:
But when the summons fell into disuse and the capias became in
fact the first process, it was thought hard to imprison a man for
a contempt which was only supposed: and therefore in common
cases by the gradual indulgence of the courts, (at length autho-
rized by... [the Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725 and amendments
thereto".9]) the sheriff or proper officer can now only personally
serve the defendant with the copy of the writ or process .... [I]f
the defendant does not appear upon the return of the writ.. . the
plaintiff may enter an appearance to him, as if he had really ap-
peared; and may file common bail in the defendant's name, and
proceed thereupon as if the defendant had done it himself.1 20
It should be observed that Blackstone cites no pre-1725 authority
and is unspecific as to which party was granted the "gradual indul-
gences." The context suggests the defendant more than the plaintiff,
since the phrase is used within a sentence referring to the reduction
of the plaintiff's right from arrest to mere service of process. Even if
Blackstone is referring to indulgences granted the plaintiff, it is possi-
ble that he means the pre-1725 practices already discussed in which
plaintiffs were allowed to enter bail for defendants whose acts in con-
nection with the case had already implied consent to the court's juris-
diction.
Reference to Coke's Institutes reveals support only for the existence
of an institution of common bail, and not for the right of the plaintiff
to enter it for the defendant.' 21
117. 1 HOLDSWORTH 220.
118. Id. n.6.
119. See note 84 supra.
120. 3 BLACKSTONE 0287.
121. After setting forth a plea containing tie clause, "hus et haut in plegio ad standum
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Thus it seems likely, as argued above, that the Frivolous Arrest Act
of 1725 truly marked the raising of summons to jurisdictional efficacy
in England, and that Professor Ehrenzweig's "power doctrine" is no
myth at all. The full exercise of jurisdiction in personal actions at
common law did require the plaintiff to "catch" his defendant in En-
gland in a very tangible sense.
E. The Decline of Attachment in England
Common law attachment, being restricted to the purpose of induc-
ing appearance by the defendant,12 2 obviously could compete neither
with arrest (especially when the defendant was insolvent) as that pro-
cedure became available in virtually all cases in which debtors could
be found, nor with outlawry of defendants who could not be found,
once forfeited property of the outlaw became available to plaintiffs
without judgments." 3 In addition, the availability of default judg-
ment against defendants who could be served with process undoubt-
edly played a role in forestalling further development of common law
attachment after outlawry had been somewhat tamed by statutes.12
Finally, local courts in important commercial centers were already of-
fering garnishment as well as attachment, and were exercising quasi in
rem jurisdiction. "As Marius points out in his Preface, 'the right deal-
ing merchant doth not care how little he hath to do in the common
law or things of that nature.' ".125
Although cases involving bills of exchange do not begin to appear
in the common law courts until 1603,120 it did not take long, following
Slade's Case,1 27 for the flow of commerical cases into the common law
courts to become a torrent.
recto," Coke says: "This plea was after the statute of Magna Charta, anno 9 H. 3. Of
these words hus and haut, two French words. Hus signifying an elder-tree, and haut the
staffe of halbert, &c, I leave the conjecture that some have made thereof to themselves:
we think it was then common bail now changed to Do and Ro .... ".4 CoKE's
IisrrrrEs 72.
122. See p. 60 supra.
123. Distringas, rather than capias, sometimes Was used when the defendant possessed
a freehold within the shire. Hastings explains this on the basis that, "To a freeholder,
the prospect of long-continued loss of small amounts in distraint would probably be
quite as unpleasant as would be the prospect of arrest to a man unencumbered by
worldly goods." M. HAisriNs, THE Couir OF CommoN PLaAs iN FizrrE-nt CEr.-rnv
ENGLAND 171-72 (1947).
124. See p. 83 infra.
125. R. STEEN, CASES ON COMNERCIAL INvESTrEN PAPER 4 (2d ed. 1954).
126. Id. 1. The case is Martin v. Boure, Cro. Jac. 6. 79 Eng. Rep. 6 (ILB. 1602-03).
Professor Aigler says that this apparently is the first such case. R. AiLER, CASES o. TiE
LAw OF BtS AND NoTES 4 (2d ed. 1955).
127. 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602-03). The same case is reported in
Sty. 138, 82 Eng. Rep. 592.
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During the seventeenth century the decisions of Lord Holt and
Lord Mansfield introduced into English Common Law most of the
customs and usages of English merchants, and the Law Merchant
became an integral part of the common law of the realm, and the
common law courts practically the only courts where commercial
cases were decided .... England had by the seventeenth century
already begun to transfer the jurisdiction over commercial cases to
the ordinary law courts, and by the eighteenth century the process
was practically complete ... 128
It is my belief that the merchants who brought these cases to the com-
mon law courts generated much of the pressure that resulted in in-
creases in the effectiveness of mesne process, and that such improve-
ments in turn hastened the flow of mercantile cases to the common law
courts. We shall next examine a common law procedure whose impor-
tance in this latter respect is too often ignored today: the process of
outlawry.
II. Outlawry and the Defendant Beyond the Reach of Process
A. Outlawry: Its Early Form as Criminal Process
Outlawry was "the last terrible weapon of ancient law,"'120 and was
a remedy "as clumsy as it was terrible."' 30 It was one of two tools-the
other was arrest-by which the law of civil process was drastically and
dramatically changed during the common law period. It came into the
law of England long prior to the Norman Conquest'31 as a crude and
barbaric method of dealing with criminals, both actual and suspected.
By the early thirteenth century it had become restricted to cases in
which defendants accused of felony or treason failed to appear to ap-
peals or indictments after having been "exacted" or commanded to
come in for the requisite number of terms of court. Upon the dread
proclamation of outlawry, such dire consequences resulted as corrup-
tion of blood, escheat of lands, forfeiture of chattels, and, as if that
were not enough, a one-way trip to the gallows without further trial.
The outlaw was so far beyond the protection of the law that he could-
at least prior to the thirteenth century-be slain on sight and with im-
punity by any person. 3 2
128. Tudsberry, Law Merchant and the Common Law, 34 L.Q. REv. 392, 399 (1918).
quoting W. MrrcHELL, AN ESSAY ON HE EARLY HisToRY OF THE LAW MERCHANT 77 (1904).
129. 1 POLLOCK & MATLAND 476.
130. 2 id. 581.
131. 1 id. 476.
132. Id.
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B. Outlawry Becomes Part of Civil Process
Trespass is often described as "the mother of actions"; it spawned
the action of trespass on the case, from which grew such causes as as-
sumpsit and trover, supplanting older and less efficient forms of action.
It is less known as the bridge by which outlawry made its way from the
criminal law into the law of civil process and partially replaced less ef-
ficient forms of process, such as attachment and distringas. Because of
the close affinity of the criminal and the civil actions of trespass'33 it is
not surprising that, in the thirteenth century, a modified form of out-
lawry should become available in personal actions of trespass vi et ar-
mis in which the defendant contumaciously refused to surrender him-
self to the law when required to do so-either on mesne process (capias
ad respondendum) or on the final process (capias ad satisfaciendum).
Outlawry in civil cases was "shorn of such terrors as peril of life, cor-
ruption of blood and escheat of lands,"1 34 but it still entailed a num-
ber of severe punitive results. The outlaw was subject to arrest under
a "general" writ of capias utlagatum or under a "special" capias utlag-
atum which authorized, in addition to arrest, the confiscation of his
goods, chattels, the profits of his land, and, at least by the late sixteenth
century, a scire facias proceeding through which debts owed to him
were confiscated. 135 The outlaw who attempted to sue could be met
with either a plea in abatement based upon his disability to sue while
an outlaw, or a plea in bar because the cause of action which had been
forefeited was no longer his to sue upon.'36
It is thus easy to understand why, given the power to "reverse" the
outlawry by appearing to the plaintiff's action 37 and conferring juris-
diction over himself, a defendant might choose to appear rather than
to remain an outlaw. Outlawry was made ever more available by stat-
133. Holdsworth calls the dvil action of trespass "semi-criminal." 3 Howswotms 626
(3d ed. 1927).
134. PLUCrtN=Er 385.
135. E.g., Beverley's Case, Moo. K.B. 241, 72 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1587), wherein the
Queen, as successor to the property forfeited by Beverley when he was outlawed, success-
fully maintained scire facias to execute a judgment which had been obtained by Beverley
prior to outlawry. An intimation that specialty debts were forfeited at an earlier date
is to be found in a nameless case in 3 Dyer 262a, 73 Eng. Rep. 582 (Star Ch. 1567), wherein
it was argued that there should be no forfeiture to the Crown of a debt "upon a contract
and not be specialty" when a man becomes a felo de se (a "felon of himself" by suicide).
See also W. TroD, THE PRAancE OF THE CouRT OF KiNGs BENCH 55, 64 (1791); T.G. oF
STAPLE INNE, supra note 88, at 33. As will be seen later, until the early 17th century some
cases held that debts on simple contracts did not pass to the Crown. See p. 87 infra.
136. See Markham v. Pitts, 3 Leo. 205, 74 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1588); Barnard's Case,
Ow. 22, 74 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1595).
137. T.G. OF STAPLE INNE, supra note 88, at 33; 3 BLAcr-on 0284. For an excellent
discussion of the various methods of reversal of outlawry in the fifteenth century, tee
HASniNGs, supra note 123, at 180.
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ute in actions of account (1285),138 debt, detinue and replevin (1350), 190
trespass on the case (1503),140 and covenant, annuity and forcible entry
(1531),141 and the reports swelled with cases of outlawry upon civil pro.
cess.
C. Further Development of Outlawry as a Plaintiff's Remedy
"Even in the thirteenth century there were many cases in which a
person might be outlawed without ever having heard of the proceed-
ings." 14 By 1589, the practice of procuring "secret outlawries in ac-
tions personal against the Queen's subjects" through proceedings and
proclamations "remote from their dwellings" where "they have not
any convenient notice of such suits against them" had become so
widespread as to evoke a statute143 setting forth elaborate procedures
designed to overcome the oppression of defendants. This statute not
only added to the clumsiness of outlawry procedure but contained the
seeds of its own partial destruction. After setting forth the procedure
to be followed, it provided that
before any writ of error, or reversing of any outlawry be had by
plea or otherwise, through or by want of any proclamation to be
had or made according to the form of this statute, . . . the defend-
ant.., in the original action shall be put in bail, not only to ap-
pear and answer to the plaintiff in the former suit, in a new action
to be commenced by said plaintiff for the cause mentioned in the
first action, but also to satisfy the condemnation ....
Thus, although it relieved defendants from the abuses of secret out-
lawry, the statute at the same time tended to compel submission to
other forms of process.144 The plaintiff was in theory required to fol-
low the statute, but if he failed to do so and instead secretly outlawed
the defendant, the defendant was in a dilemma. If he failed to procure
the setting aside of the outlawry or its reversal, he might suffer forfei-
ture; to reverse the outlawry or have it set aside for want of proclama-
tion, he must furnish bail to an action on the plaintiff's cause, thereby
subjecting himself to possible judgment. And the bail required of the
defendant under the Act of 1589 was extraordinary in its nature.
138. The Statute of Westminster The Second of 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, c. 11.
139. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 17.
140. 19 Hen. 7, c. 9.
141. 23 Hen. 8, c. 14.
142. 3 HoLDswoRTH 605 (3d ed. 1927).
143. 81 Eliz. 1, c. 3 (1589).
144. This result was recognized in the case of Wilbraham v. Doley, 12 Mod, 545, 88
Eng. Rep. 1508 (K.B. 1701).
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Whereas ordinary bail above (sureties) agreed to surrender the defend-
ant or to pay the condemnation, 145 the Act of 1589 denied the bail
such an election, and required them to be answerable at all events for
the condemnation money in the new action.240 Although the defend-
ant could avoid the requirement of such "absolute" bail by reversing
the outlawry through writ of error asserting some "common law error
in fact" such as his having been "beyond the sea" during the outlawry
proceedings, he was still required to put in bail "in ordinary form;
giving the bail the power of rendering."1 47 This has been referred to
as "a very good project to get bail from a foreigner."' 48
These procedures gave rise to such abuses of process that, in 1692,
Parliament noted that
divers persons are prosecuted in said court of King's Bench to out-
lawries for debts, trespasses, and other misdemeanors, and there is
no reversing such outlawries but by the personal appearance of the
persons outlawed, so that the persons arrested upon such outlaw-
ries (if poor) lie in prison till their deaths, but if able, it costs them
very dear to reverse the same outlawries .... 
1 4
The Act of 1692 permitted persons outlawed in civil actions to ap-
pear by attorney and reverse their outlawries without bail "except
where special bail shall be ordered by the said court," and permitted
persons already in custody to obtain their freedom by making special
bail. It was thus undoubtedly a product of the same sentiments that
later resulted in the Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725.' tO
145. In Wilbraham V. Doley, 12 Mod. 545, 88 Eng. Rep. 1508 (K.B. 1701), an outlaw
was permitted to reverse his outlawry by writ of error upon putting in "bail to answer
the condemnation, or render his body." The court contrasted this bail with the absolute
bail under 31 EiIz. 1, c. 3 (1589), saying, "for as the statute made a new error for the
advantage of the outlawed person, so it thought to recompense that with another to the
creditor, that in that case he should have good bail to his action." The reader should be
cautioned not to infer that, because the bail under 31 Eliz. 1, c. 3 is referred to as "good
bail," the bail actually ordered upon writ of error in Wilbraham v. Doley in law was
"baw" bail. As indicated by the text, a more proper description of bail under the Statute
of 31 Eliz. 1 would be "better bail," since the bail thereunder could not avoid liability
for the defendant's debt by surrendering him.
146. This feature of 31 Eliz. 1, c. 5 precipitated much litigation and judicial comment.
See, e.g., Hide's Case, Het. 147, 124 Eng. Rep. 412 (C.P. 1629); Havelock v. Geddes, 12
East. 622, 101 Eng. Rep. 242 (K.B. 1810); Mathews v. Gibson, 8 East. 527, 103 Eng. Rep.
445 (LB. 1807); Campbell v. Daley, 3 Burr. 1920, 97 Eng. Rep. 1169 (LB. 1766); Wil-
braam v. Doley, 12 Mod. 545, 88 Eng. Rep. 1508 (K.B. 1701); Matthews v. Erbo, Carth.
459, 90 Eng. Rep. 865 (K.B. 1698). See also C. P.n T.oa.F A PnacrIAL TEATM oN_ TH
LAw OF BAIL IN CIVM & CRI MNAL PROcEDINGs 444 (1835) [hereinafter cited as PramSorF];
ScHRoDER, LAw OF BAiL 178 (1824).
147. Havelock v. Geddes, 12 East. 622, 104 Eng. Rep. 242 (K.B. 1810).
148. Matthews v. Erbo, Carth. 459, 90 Eng. Rep. 865 (LB. 1698).
149. 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 18 (1692).
150. It is only in the light of this statute that a time-blurring statement by Holds',orth
can be understood:
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D. The Sheriff's Liability
If the outlaw were taken into custody and the sheriff allowed him
to escape, the plaintiff could maintain an action against the sheriff. If
the outlawry were upon mesne process, an action of trespass on the
case qui tam would lie because of the possibility of damage to the
plaintiff occasioned by the delay of recovery of his debt-since the
outlaw might have procured his release from imprisonment by fur-
nishing security for an appearance to a new original writ brought by
the plaintiff on his debt.' 51 If the outlawry were upon final process, the
judgment creditor could maintain an action of debt against the sheriff
under statutory provisions of long standing 152 which had been judi-
cially construed as applicable beyond their narrow wording.15 3
E. Outlawry and Property Beyond the Reach of Other Common Law
Process
Let us now consider the manner in which the law of outlawry be-
came the method by which a plaintiff could eventually reach both the
property of a debtor who would not appear to the action or one who
would not surrender to capias ad satisfaciendum, and debts owed to
such a debtor.
It has been pointed out above that, under a special capias utlagatum,
the goods and profits of land owned by an outlaw could be seized by
the Crown, and that upon scire facias the Crown could collect debts
owed to the outlaw. The extraordinary nature of capias utlagatum is
illustrated by a case in which the court of King's Bench, while uphold-
ing the right of a householder to deny admission to his home to a sher-
iff armed with a capias ad satisfaciendum, observed that had the writ
It is true that, if application were made to set aside the outlawry [on the ground
that the defendant was not within the kingdom when the proceedings took place],
he must pay the costs of the outlawry, and enter an appearance, so that the object
of the outlawry was secured. But, if he chose to take proceedings to get it reversed
by a writ of error he need neither pay costs nor enter an appearance; so that "the
plaintiff was left in a worse position than he was before the proceedings to outlawry
was instituted."
9 HoLDswoRTH 255. Such a "worse position" resulted only as a result of the Statute of
4 & 5 W. & M., c. 18 (1692), and then only in cases in which the court, in its exercise of
discretion, denied bail. See PEERSDORF 444.151. Bonner v. Stokeley, Cro. Eliz. 652, 78 Eng. Rep. 891 (K.B. 1599); see also Whitacres
v. Onsley, 3 Dyer 322b, 73 Eng. Rep. 729 (K.B. 1574).
152. The Statute of Westminster the Second of 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, c. 11; 1 Rich. 2,
c. 12 (1377).
153. See Platt v. Lock, I Plow. 35, 75 Eng. Rep. 57 (Ex. 1550). In this case the Barons of
Exchequer held that the Statute of I Rich. 2, c. 12, which authorized the action of debt
against the Warden of the Fleet for the escape of a prisoner taken on execution ofjudgment, could be "extended by equity" to permit recovery for such an escape from
the custody of the Gaolers of Ludgate.
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been a capias utlagatum the defendant's door legally could have been
broken down, because an outlaw is "out of the protection of the
law.' '154 It is only natural that creditors should have pressed for more
direct benefits from such a potent process than its use to induce the de-
fendant to appear or to surrender to capias. How much more efficient
and certain would be their remedy if they could (1) avoid the necessity
of appearance by their debtors, (2) resort directly to the property for-
feited to the Grown, and (3) have access to debts owed their debtors,
a kind of property which they could not reach by any existing common
law process. All three of these objectives had been accomplished by the
beginning of the seventeenth century.
We must remember that outlawry could be upon mesne as well as
upon final process. It was the combination of outlawry on mesne pro-
cess and a willingness on the part of the Crown to permit the plaintiff
to recover his debt out of the forfeited property, even when the out-
lawry was upon mesne process,ES that enabled the accomplishment of
the first two of the objectives stated above. By 1602 counsel for a plain-
tiff could state to the court that "if the Queen by virtue of the capias
utlagatum has any goods, she is to satisfy the party at whose suit the out-
lawry came," and Chief Justice Popham did not disagree with the no-
don of satisfying the plaintiff out of the forfeited goods, although he
pointed out that such a procedure was "de grata and not de jure."'"'
By 1718 this procedure had become so commonplace that we find
the Lord Chancellor directing the plaintiff (who had brought a bill to
subject the outlawed defendant's beneficial interest in an annuity to
payment of the plaintiff's debt) to go first and obtain a grant of the
annuity from the Crown, which, although "upon application to the
Court of Exchequer, he would of course have," he still was required
to procure before returning to Chancery for relief.1a5 In 1720 we find
counsel stating in argument that outlawry "had been held by very
learned men to be at first ex gratia regis and not de jutre ... ,"15 and in
1725 Chancery held that a plaintiff could not maintain a bill of dis-
154. Seyman v. Gresham, Cro. Eliz. 908, 78 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602).
155. Pinfold v. East-India Co., 2 Lev. 49, 83 Eng. Rep. 444 (K.B. 1672).
156. Jennings v. Hatley, Yelv. 20, 80 Eng. Rep. 14 (KB. 1602). Cf. Pimb's Case, Moore.
196, 72 Eng. Rep. 528 (K.B. 1585), translated in W. CRUtsE, AN Ess..y OF Uss 47, and
found in H. ScoTT & A. ScoTT, CASES ON TRusTs 286 (5th ed. 1965). In that cae land was
conveyed to Scudamore and his wife through the medium of a fine to one Throckmorton
to the use of Scudamore and wife. Later, Throckmorton was attainted of treason committed
prior to the conveyance, and his "instantaneous seisin" was held sufficient to cause the
land to be forfeited to the Queen free of the use to the Scudamores. Queen Elizabeth,
however, "much to her honor, granted the land to the cestui que use by patent."
157. Balch v. Wastall, 1 Peere Wins. 445, 446, 24 Eng. Rep. 465 (Ch. 1718).
158. Throgmorton v. Church, 1 Peere Wms. 685, 690, 24 Eng. Rep. 571, 573 (H. 1720).
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covery against the defendant whom he had had outlawed until he had
received a grant of the forfeited goods or debts from the Crown.
[T]he Crown is not a trustee for the plaintiff, but it is merely out
of grace that the King makes such grant of the goods of persons
outlawed to the Plaintiffs who have no manner of right in these
goods, until the grant obtained from the Crown .... I'l
By 1829, however, the Parliamentary Commission could report that
plaintiffs' petitions to the Lords of the Treasury were consented to by
the attorney general "as of course." 160 One can only conjecture as to
the exact time when the Crown began to grant the outlaw's forfeited
property to the plaintiff so routinely as to render the grant a matter of
course. It seems clear, however, that such administrative grants con-
tinued to be a necessary formality for plaintiffs to enjoy full judicial
status as to the forfeitures well into the nineteenth century.
To turn now to debts, by 1576 it had been established that the
Queen was entitled, as successor to the property forfeited by an out-
law, to maintain a scire facias to execute a judgment which had been
obtained by him prior to outlawry; 16' and a dictum in 1587102 suggests
that the King had been taking debts upon specialties upon outlawry of
their owners. 63 When added to the tangible property forfeited by the
outlaw, such intangibles sometimes made up sufficient assets to pay the
plaintiff.
Possibly by 1655,164 and at least by 1725,10 outlawry had become
sufficiently recognized as a formal creditor's remedy to enable the
plaintiff to maintain a bill in equity to discover what goods of the
outlaw were in the hands of a third party, even though the plaintiff
did not show by his bill that he had yet received from the Crown a
grant of these gooods or of any debt owed the outlaw, This procedure
was called, in 1867, a "barbarous and roundabout sort of foreign at-
tachment."'16 The plaintiff also could obtain from Exchequer a lease
159. - v. Bromley, 2 Peere Wins. 269, 24 Eng. Rep. 725 (1725).
160. FrsT REPORT 91.
161. See Beverley's Case, Moo. 241, 72 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1576).
162. Markham v, Pitts, 3 Leo. 205, 74 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1588).
163. The forfeiture of debts upon simple contracts was in doubt until the beginning
of the seventeenth century. See pp. 87-89 & notes 169-77 infra.
164. In The Protector v. Lumley, Hardr, 22, 145 Eng. Rep. 360 (Ex. 1655), It was held
that the Attorney General could maintain a bill against an outlaw to discover his estate
and his fraudulent conveyances, "because the Protector is entitled to his estate by course
of law; and the outlawry is in the nature of a gift to the King, or a judgment for him.
And a common person may have a bill of discovery in the like case, to enabld hint to
take out execution... "
165. v. Bromley, 2 Peere Wins. 269, 24 Eng. Rep. 725 (1725).
166. Mayor and Aldermen v. Cox, L.R. 2 H.L. 239, 272 (1867).
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of the outlaw's lands or a grant of the King's right to levy upon the
profits. Money in the sheriff's hands as the result of forfeiture inciden-
tal to outlawry could be obtained by the plaintiff through application
to the Court of Exchequer for an order to the sheriff to pay what he
held to the plaintiff in satisfaction of his debt. If the amount sought
by the plaintiff exceeded Z50, he was required to obtain approval of
an application to the Lords of the Treasury prior to procuring Exche-
quer's order to the sheriff to pay him the money.1 7 Such a procedure
is reminiscent of the return of stolen property to the owner after a suc-
cessful claim of robbery or larceny brought by him, and well may have
grown out of such a practice, or out of the same philosophy.' s
F. Outlawry's Possible Role in the Development of Indebitatus As-
sumpsit
Although debts upon specialties were forfeited to the Crown upon
the outlawry of the creditor, some cases prior to the seventeenth century
had held that debts upon sealed contracts were not so forfeited.20c The
distinction grew out of the difference in mode of trial of the several
different pleas of general issue which were used in actions of debt on
a specialty and debt on a contract. It is at least possible that this differ-
ence of treatment in outla ry was partly responsible for the revolu-
tionary development of the indebitatus assumpsit action in the han-
dling of contract cases.
In debt on a specialty, if the instrument was valid at law, the plea
of general issue, non est factum, put in issue only the question whether
the seal on the instrument was that of the defendant.170 This issue was
tried by a jury composed of persons at least some of whom probably
would know the seal of the defendant.17' In debt on a contract, on the
other hand, the plea of general issue, nihil debet, permitted the defend-
ant to "wage his law," that is, to deny the indebtedness by oath aided
by compurgators or "oath-helpers" who would swear that they believed
the defendant's oath. 72 Such a practice probably made sense in its
167. IV. TrD, supra note 135. Frost REPORT 91.
168. See generally 2 HorsDwoRTH 361, It is interesting to note that, until 1529, the
stolen property went to the Crown when the conviction was upon indictment See also
21 Hen. 8, c. 11 (1529).
169. Shaw v. Cutteris, Cro. Eliz. 850, 78 Eng. Rep. 1076 (K.B. 1599); Barnard's Case,
74 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1595) (dictum); Markham v. Pitts, 3 Leo. 205, 74 Eng. Rep. 635
(K.B. 1588) (dictum). See also authorities cited note 177 infra.
170. H. SHEHN, PL.EADINGS 279 (2d ed. J. Andrews 1901); PLuCKNErT 633, n.3; C. Flroor,
HIsroRY AND SoUcREs OF THE COMMON LAw 232 (1949).
171. H. S-PiEN, supra note 168, at 261.
172. Id. 235-36.
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original context, when such contracts and their satisfaction were likely
to be oral and witnessed only by the parties, and when oaths were not
lightly taken.173 The development of indebitatus assumpsit is generally
explained as a device for circumventing wager of law which, by the
time of Slade's Case in 160 1,14 had become an unreliable mode of trial
because "in these days so little consideration is made of an oath .... ,15
Slade's Case decided that every debt imports an "assumpsit" or promise
to pay, and made the action of indebitatus assumpsit available as an
alternative remedy to debt on an unsealed contract to pay a sum certain.
This new remedy, as an outgrowth of trespass on the case, did not per-
mit the defendant to wage law as a defense, but put the issues to a trial
by jury. The desirability, from the plaintiff's point of view, of avoiding
the risk of wager of law is of course undeniable. There may, however,
have been an additional reason for circumventing such an important
defendant's right.
Since a party could not wage his law against the King,170 a forfeiture
to the Crown of debts upon simple unsealed contracts owed to outlaws
would deprive their debtors of the valuable right to wage law as a
defense against the claims of the Crown. The obvious unfairness of
depriving such debtors of this right solely because of the misconduct
of their outlawed creditors resulted in decisions that debts subject to
wager of law were not forfeited to the Crown. With the appearance
of indebitatus assumpsit there no longer was any reason for such debts
not to go to the King, and the old rule to the contrary disappeared.
It is possible, of course, that this extension of forfeiture was simply
an incidental byproduct of the new remedy. But it seems reasonable
to assume that the justices in Slade's Case were at least influenced by
the Crown's and creditors' interest in making it possible for debts owed
to outlaws on unsealed contracts to be forfeited. I suggest that the possi-
bilities of new forfeitures played their part in precipitating Slade's
Case, although dissatisfaction with compurgation probably was the
principal moving force behind the decision. An examination of the
report of the case reveals that the participants discussed at some length
173. For a fine exposition of this subject see id. 537. See also PoTrER 318.174. 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1601). Fifoot places the case in the year1602 and Ames places it in 1603. C. FiFOOT, supra note 170, at 371; J. Alms, LErv, s ONLEGAL HISTORY 145 (1913). Coke's Reports, however, gives the term at which the pleadingswere settled as Hillary, 38 Elizabeth, which would be in January, 1595, and the term atwhich the opinion was rendered as Trinity, 44 Elizabeth, which would be May-June, 1601.For dating of English cases, see M. PRICE AND H. BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARcII '121(1953).
175. Slade's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 95b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, at 1079 (K.B. 1601).
176. Id.
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the interrelationship between wager of law and forfeiture of property
which has been described above, and that forfeiture upon outlawry
was expressly considered. The report also indicates that earlier instances
had been adduced of forfeitures which had caused debtors to be "ousted
of their law." These obscure cases, 177 none of which is stated to be a
case of forfeiture upon outlawry, were apparently referred to as the
source of a "doubt in our books" on the subject at hand, to help explain
the significance of the resolution of that doubt through approval of a
procedure which it was dearly understood would result in a forfeiture
of simple contract debts. I would emphasize that the court, in permit-
ting trespass on the case to be used as an alternative remedy to debt
on a contract, demonstrated in its opinion a complete awareness of the
effect its decision would have in approving, if not establishing for the
first time, the forfeiture of such debts. Is it not reasonable to assume
that this wholly anticipated effect was in fact one of the causes of the
decision?
G. The Deficiencies of Outlawry as a Civil Process
Many of the deficiencies of outlawry should be clear from the fore-
going discussion. Writing in 1829, a Parliamentary Commission com-
mented that "[t7he practice of Outlawry is one of those abuses which
are prejudicial to the rights of both the contending parties. If it inflicts
on the plaintiff the evils of delay and expense, it subjects the defendant
on the other hand, to surprise and oppression."' 78 As to delay, it appears
that the process of outlawry required at least twelve and sometimes
thirty months,'79 during which time insolvency of the defendant could
destroy the plaintiff's chances of collecting his debt and leave him with
a large bill for court costs.180 In the early nineteenth century, merely
to proceed to outlawry cost the plaintiff, exclusive of the price of his
original writ (and a plaintiff who would outlaw his defendant was
required to proceed by original writ rather than by bill181) a "low aver-
age' of £ 17.18s2 To proceed all the way to a final collection through
outlawry would cost him £40 or more.1s3 Outlawry also entailed the
177. The following are cited in Slade's Case as "sudden opinions" apparently against
forfeiture of simple contract debts: "49 E. 3. 5. 50 Ass. 1. 16 E. 4. 4. and 9 Eiz. 262 .... "
4 Co. Rep. at 95a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1079. A footnote tells us that the last citation is
Dyer 262 (78 Eng. Rep. 582 (Star. Ch. 1567)).
178. Fmsr REPORT 93.
179. 1 POLLOCK & MArrLAND 539.
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possibility of reversal by the defendant, who could obtain restoration
of his property or its proceeds up to the very time they were transferred
to the plaintiff.'8 4 Outlawry was thus unfair, expensive, dilatory, and
uncertain. Yet for centuries it was the most effective process available
against defendants in some situations.
H. Jurisdiction Over Defendants Not Personally Served With Process
By the seventeenth century, then, outlawry had become a means
whereby a plaintiff could reach property, including debts, confiscated
under special capias utlagatum in cases where (in theory but not always
in actuality) the defendant was evading arrest 185 As we have seen, how-
ever, there were great disadvantages to such a procedure from the
plaintiff's point of view. An alternative in the superior courts was
finally established in 1811186 by a statute which provided that, in casesbegun by original writ in which no capias was issued, where the defend-
ant could not be met with for personal service, the plaintiff was per-
mitted to obtain a writ of distringas under which the defendant's
chattels and the issues of his land were seized, and the summons left
at his abode. After taking such steps, the plaintiff was authorized to
enter an appearance for the defendant and to obtain both an in per-
sonam judgment against him and satisfaction out of the property dis-
trained. Constructions of this statute and its 1827 successor 87 in Com-
mon Pleas and in Exchequer, however, rendered them cumbrous in
application to all defendants and useless as against defendants who were
merely absent, as, for example, those abroad on protracted business.
These courts required an affidavit from the plaintiff stating "that he
believes the defendant has kept out of the way to avoid service," and
required three attempts to serve the defendant personally at his abode,
the last time being on the return day, before the writ of distringas
would issue.188 It is reported that, as a result plaintiffs often preferred
the older method of common law distringas with its writ of distress
infinite.18 9
The situation as it existed in 1829 was described as follows by a
Parliamentary Commission:
184. Id.
185. Pinfold v. East-India Co., 2 Lev. 49, 83 Eng. Rep. 444 (Ex. 1672).186. 51 Geo. 3, c. 124 (1811). The statute was extended to November 1, 1823, andthence to the end of the next session of Parliament by 57 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1817).
187. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71 (1827).
188. Fxasr REPORT 87.
189. Id.
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It will be observed, that the different modes of... operation [of
statutory and common law distringas], as above explained, all
suppose, either that the defendant may be personally found within
the jurisdiction (that is, within the limits of England and Wales,
and Berwick-upon-Tweed,) or that he has some known place of
abode there, and some property against which a statuable dis-
tringas may issue; or that he at least has property on which the
plaintiff may act by the method of distress infinite. But if the case
be supposed of his being absent from the realm, and without a
known place of abode or property in this country, on which a dis-
tringas, either statuable or at common law, can be executed, the
plaintiff has then no means of compelling an appearance, except
by proceeding to Outlawry.190
Although the Uniformity of Process Act of 1832101 permitted the
plaintiff to proceed to judgment and execution against defendants not
personally served, even though the writ of distringas were returned
non est inventus and nulla bona, it was still tied to a distringas proce-
dure. Such a tie-in, while not expressly restricting the operation of the
statute to residents of England, quite likely was intended to do so, for
distringas is the kind of remedy which by its very nature seems to be
directed at residents. -92 Twenty years later, in contrast, the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1852 provided for initiating actions for breach
of contracts "made within the jurisdiction" against British subjects and
aliens residing beyond the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts (except
in Scotland or Ireland).9 3 Upon affidavit that the writ had been person-
ally served or that "reasonable Efforts were made to effect personal
Service... and ... it came to his [defendant's] knowledge," and that
the defendant either "wilfully neglects to appear" or is "living out of
the Jurisdiction . . . in order to defeat and delay his Creditors," the
court could proceed to have the amount of the debt or damages
ascertained by a jury under a writ of inquiry or by a master, according
to the nature of the case, and render judgment accordingly.1 4 "Bracton
indeed had argued that debts and damages ought to be levied from
a defaulter's personal property, but (as Maitland remarked) it took six
hundred years for his view to prevail,"'91 except by the tortuous route
of outlawry.
190. FmT REPORT 90.
191. Uniformity of Process Act of 1832, 2 Will. 4, c. 39.
192. See note 123 supra.
193. 15 g: 16 Vict., c. 76, §§ 18, 19. The modern version of this act is to be found in
Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Part XII, Order XI. This modem version is
much broader than the original, and permits jurisdiction to be based on a wide variety
of situations giving England a substantial connection with the cause.
194. Id.
195. PLUcKN-=r 386.
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The problem of defendants beyond the jurisdiction of the court elic-
ited similar developments in Chancery procedure during the nine-
teenth century. In 1832, Parliament enacted a statute to correct the
"great inconvenience and delays of justice" arising "from the defect
of jurisdiction in courts of Equity to effectuate the service of their
process" in parts of the United Kingdom which were beyond their
jurisdiction. 196 Although this statute and an 1834 act extending its
scope 197 were restricted to specified classes of suits concerning land or
government and public corporations, further extensions of jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants were not long in coming. An act of 1840198
granted the Lord Chancellor authority to promulgate rules and orders
of court, including rules effecting changes "generally in the form and
mode of proceeding to obtain relief, and in the general practice of the
Court in relation thereto."'199 In 1845, pursuant to this statute, the
Chancellor promulgated a general order unqualifiedly permitting a
plaintiff to enter an appearance for a defendant who had failed to enter
one for himself after service of subpoena upon him in any "place or
country. '20 0 It should be noted that this 1845 order was broader than
the 1832 and 1834 statutes mentioned above in two particulars. First,
it was not restricted as to the kind of suit to which it applied; second,
it permitted service of subpoena anywhere in the world. Until the case
of Drummond v. Drummond" ° in 1866, however, judicial thought was
split as to whether the general orders of 1845, as incorporated in a gen-
eral order of 1860202 was effective according to its broad terms or
whether it was to be restricted to the kinds of suits specified in the
1832 and 1834 statutes. Drummond v. Drummond held that Parliament
had in fact delegated the more general power to the Chancellor and
that the orders were effective as written. The opinion of Sir G. J.
Turner, L.J., in that case is of particular interest in its discussion of
the limits upon the inherent power of the court:
[prior to the 1845 rule based upon the 1840 Act] subpoenas
could be and were served out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and
196. 2 Will. 4, c. 33.
197. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 82.
198. 3 & 4 Vict., c. 94. This law was amended in 1841 in particulars not relevant here.
4 & 5 Vict., c. 52.
199. Under this statute, such rules and orders were "of like Force and Effect, as If the
Provisions contained therein had been expressly enacted by Parliament, unless the same
thall, by Vote of either House of Parliament, be objected to."
200. General Orders in Chancery of May 8, 1845, Order 33.
201. L.R. 2 Ch. App. 32 (1866). See this case for a review of the conflicting authorities
on the subject.
202. In 1860, the 33rd General Order of May 8, 1845 was brought forward as Rule 7
of Order 10 of the Consolidated Orders in Chancery of 1860.
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... if the party served appeared to the suit in consequence of the
service, the service was effectual, and the suit could proceed against
the party, but... if the party served did not appear upon the sub-
poena, the service could not be made effectual, and the suit could
not be proceeded in against the party served. There was at this
time no such practice as that introduced by the Orders of the 8th
of May, 1845, of entering an appearance for a Defendant at the
instance of the Plaintiff.
... Was it then competent to the Court, by force of its general
powers to alter this practice, and to render the service of a subpoena
out of the jurisdiction of the Court effectual, either by authorizing
an attachment to be issued in default of appearance, or by giving
the Plaintiff the right to enter an appearance upon default? I am
disposed to think that it was not, for to have done so would have
been not to alter the process of the Court, but to give an effect
to the subpoena, the Queen's writ, which the writ, not being avail-
able beyond the jurisdiction, did not of itself possess. So far, there-
fore, as this order rested upon the general powers of the Court, I
think it was of no avail, and the validity of the order must, there-
fore, depend upon the statdtes
2 03
I. Garnishment Execution Becomes Available; the Demise of Out-
lawry in Civil Cases
As we saw earlier, it was only by way of outlawry that debts owed
to a defendant could be reached at common law-at first as a purely
confiscatory procedure by the Crown, and later as a collection procedure
by the plaintiff.2°4 We also have observed that this was not an entirely
satisfactory procedure, because it could be unfair, expensive, cumber-
some and uncertain. Nevertheless, it continued to be used for a long
time because of the pressure it exerted upon the defendant who could
not be served with process to appear and confer jurisdiction over him-
self, and because of its eventual use as a means of collecting from non-
appearing defendants.
With the passage of the Statute of 1811, -05 however, followed by the
Statute of 1827,206 the Uniformity of Process Act of 1832,207 and the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1852,208 making possible in personam
judgments against non-appearing defendants not personally served
within the jurisdiction, the first of these needs for outlawry disappeared.
It did not take long for the practice to disappear as well. In the five
203. Drumond v. Drummond, L.R. 2 Ch. App. 32, 43 (186) (emphasis added).
204. Pp. 85-86 supra.
205. 51 Geo. 3, c. 124. See p. 90 supra.
206. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71.
207. 2 Will. 4, c. 39.
208. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76.
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years between 1823 and 1827, out of a total of 898,464 actions brought
in the superior courts in England, only 788 cases resulted in outlawry
of the defendants.20 9 In 1854 Parliament finally provided formally for
garnishment execution 210 and, in 1879, outlawry was abolished in the
United Kingdom "in or in consequence of any civil proceeding .... .21
Although garnishment execution (a final process) was provided for
in 1854, garnishment as a mesne process has not yet been established
in the superior courts. This omission has been explained by a member
of the House of Lords as follows:
Indeed there is good reason to believe that the Legislature ad-
visedly abstained from adopting foreign attachment (garnishment]
upon mesne process, as being a retrograde step toward imprison.
ment for debt before judgment, in cases where the debt was dis-
puted.21 2
III. Conclusion
The evidence I have been able to examine convinces me that Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig's "power myth" thesis is incorrect, especially as re-
gards his belief that the "power doctrine" of Pennoyer v. Neff is histor-
ically wrong. The common law courts neither exercised nor believed
they could exercise jurisdiction in personal actions without either physi-
cal custody of the defendant or an appearance by him. The history of
mesne process at common law is largely concerned with the methods
by which one or the other of these events was brought about.
The principal common law mesne processes were attachment, dis-
tringas, arrest, and outlawry. Once arrest had displaced attachment and
distringas as the leading mesne process of the superior courts, there
were two popular methods of proceeding against one's debtor. If the
debtor could be found, arrest in connection with a Bill of Middlesex
or its equivalent was the preferred procedure in most cases. If the
debtor could not be reached in person, outlawry was the plaintiff's only
recourse until the nineteenth century. From both the plaintiffs' and
the defendants' standpoints these processes were unsatisfactory in many
respects and were slow to improve. Prior to the advent of the Bill of
209. FIRST REPORT 202.
210. Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c, 125, §§ 60-67, modified by
Common Law Procedure Act of 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 126, §§ 28-31.
211. Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act of 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59, § 3. Outlatwry was
not abolished in criminal proceedings until 1938. Administration of Justice (Mis.) 1 & 2
Geo. 6, c. 63, § 12.
212. Mayor and Aldermen v. Cox, L.R. 2 HL. 239, 272 (1867) (Willies, J.).
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Middlesex, arrest was not available to most plaintiffs, and prior to the
statutes extending the scope of civil outlawry, the same was true of
that process. Both processes could be, and often were, slow, expensive,
involved, and uncertain of outcome. Moreover, until the coming, prob-
ably in the late sixteenth century, of de grata application to the plain-
tiff's debt of property forfeited by outlaws, 13 and the early nineteenth
century statuable distringas and cash deposit procedures,214 the flouting
of process enriched the King, but not the plaintiff. Until the Frivolous
Arrest Act of 1725,215 no judgment nihil dicit could be rendered for
the plaintiff against a defendant in a personal action unless lie either
was in custody of the law or had entered an appearance, which the
plaintiff could not do for him without his consent. Until the Act of
1811,216 no judgment save of outlawry could be rendered against a
defendant who could not be served personally, and even then only
against persons resident within the jurisdiction of the superior courts,
who had distrainable property and were evading process. 17 Jurisdiction
over non-residents who could not be served within the realm was pro-
vided for by statute in 1852 as to contracts made by them within the
jurisdiction.218
Garnishment, as such, was not provided for in superior court proce-
dures, although garnishment execution was authorized by the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1854.219 There was, however, a sort of round-
about garnishment and garnishment execution with the advent, prob-
ably in the late sixteenth century, of scire facias in connection with out-
lawry of persons owing debts,2 2 0 although then only as to defendants
who would not render their bodies in response to mesne or final process.
Attachments, moreover, could be dissolved by a defendant's entering
an appearance. If the defendant was arrested, special bail could be
required; but special bail might be little aid to plaintiff, for the bail
could discharge themselves by arresting the defendant and rendering
him into custody. Furthermore, the special bail might themselves be-
come insolvent, or the surrendered and imprisoned debtor's assets
might not be discoverable and the debtor might prefer jail to payment
of his debt. There is dramatic evidence that, until peine forte et dure
213. Cf. Pinfold v. East-India Co., 2 Lev. 49, 83 Eng. Rep. 444 (Ex. 1672).
214. 43 Geo. 3, c. 46 (1803); The Imprisonment for Debt Act, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 71 (182).
215. 12 Geo. 1, c. 29.
216. 51 Geo. 3, c. 124.
217. See Fn=r REPORT 87.
218. The Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, 15 & 16 VicL, c. 76.
219. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125, §§ 60-67.
220. See Beverley's Case, Moo. 241, 72 Eng. Rep. 555 (K.B. 1576).
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was abolished in 1772,221 some persons accused of crime preferred tor-
ture and even death to the risk of conviction by jury and forfeiture of
property to the Crown. 22
Thus we find that the only way property of a debtor could be reached
for direct satisfaction of an unsecured debt was through some form
of execution. But execution required a judgment, and judgment re-
quired jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-appear-
ing defendant was late to arrive on the legal scene. The reluctance of the
common law courts to exercise such jurisdiction stemmed in part from
a feeling that, until the debt was proved, the plaintiff had no business
disturbing the property of the defendant228 (at least so long as he had
not been outlawed). The King (as represented by his court) could seize
the defendant's property to redress the contempt of his authority repre-
sented by the defendant's failure to obey the summons or exigent, but
by entering an early appearance, the defendant could prevent even
this molestation of his property as well as his possible outlawry. Attach-
ment and distringas might eventually, to be sure, have been modified
so as to provide provisional security which would survive the appear-
ance of the defendant and be available for satisfaction of any judgment
obtained against him. The rise of arrest and the consequent disuse of
attachment and distringas, however, effectively prevented such an ex-
pansion of their use.
When we look back upon the long and tortuous evolution of efficient
creditors' remedies under the common law, we can understand why
local courts, which had been acting quasi in rem for many years, which
acted with dispatch, and which allowed garnishment of debts owed a
defendant, were popular with creditors seeking simple debt collection.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the steady develop-
ment of more effective process, but it was a development by evolution,
nearly always involving modifications of and accretions to existing
forms. As a result, the reforms in process which were achieved were
heavily burdened with barnacles of the past. A good example of this
221. "An Act for the more effective proceeding against persons standing nute on
their arraignment for felony or piracy." 12 Geo. III, c. 20 (1772).
222. See PLUCKNErT 126; J. MARKE, VIGNETTES OF LEGAL HISTORY 209 (1965).
223. 1 W. WADE, ATTACHMENTS § 2 (1887). Penoyar v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 44 N.E. 788
(1896). Except for the New England states and Hawaii, where attachment and garnish-
ment are allowed as of right in most actions for monetary relief (e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-279 (1958)), the same attitude is reflected in the reluctance of American jurisdictions
today to grant such provisional relief without special grounds such as the non-residence,
absence or absconding of the debtor. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2679, 2729 (1912). Under
the UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS Acr (1948), levy is allowed immediately
after registration of the foreign judgment, undoubtedly in recognition of the fact that
the debtor already has had his opportunity to contest the original cause of action.
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deference to old forms was the insistence of the courts upon the formal-
ity of bail entered of record-even in cases of common bail with ficti-
tious sureties-in order to support the court's jurisdiction. The pres-
ence of the defendant and his participation in the proceedings were
not enough, although they eventually became enough to enable the
plaintiff to enter bail for the defendant; the bail entry had to appear
of record if the judgment rendered was to be valid. The Frivolous
Arrest Act of 1725, while it provided the machinery for a plaintiff to
effect his defendant's appearance in court by mere "serviceable" (non-
bailable) process, did so within the framework of the old arrest and
bail procedure. Not until the enactment of the great nineteenth century
procedural statutes and the promulgation of new court rules under
their authority did the old forms change in any fundamental respect.
With the new statutes and rules, however, there finally came a more
direct and candid approach to the old problems of getting jurisdiction
over defendants who could be found for service of process, as well as




13th Civil outlawry in trespass.
Civil outlawry in account (1285 Act).
14th Jurisdiction asserted over prisoners on bills for personal actions.
Civil outlawry in debt, detinue g- replevin (1350 Act).
15th Special bail as right of defendant (1444 Act).
Bill of Middlesex.
16th Civil outlawry in trespass on the case (1503 Act).
Civil outlawry in forcible entry (1531 Act).
Debts of outlaws forfeited to Crown: judgments (by 1576); spe-
cialties (by ?).
Common bail in cases under £ 10 (by 1582 Rule of C.P.).
"Absolute" bail required to reverse outlawry for want of procla-
mation (1589 Act).
Forfeited property available to satisfy plaintiff, de grata.
17th Slade's Case (1601): assumpsit for contract debt; contract debts
forfeited by outlaws.
Assignment of bail bond when D does not appear; becomes com-
monplace (by 1683).
Arrest becomes usual mode of process (by 1683).
Outlaw can reverse (a) through attorney, (b) without bail, unless
ordered by court (1692 Act).
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Sheriff liable in trespass on the case when D, out on bail, fails
to appear (1699).
18th Assignment of bail bond below, when D defaults, becomes P's
right (1705).
Frivolous Arrest Act of 1725-"serviceable" process; default
judgment.
19th Cash deposit by D permitted in lieu of bail; P can enter D's ap-
pearance, apply deposit to judgment (1803 Act).
Distringas & abode service v. D, with distrainable property, evad-
ing service (1811 Act).
Distringas & abode service v. D, without distrainable property,
evading service (1832 Act).
Civil arrest abolished except by court order; summons begins
nearly all civil actions (1838 Act).
Garnishment execution (1854 Act).
Outlawry abolished in civil cases (1879 Act).
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